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Jennifer Leigh Harrison 
A Discontinuous Space: Postmodern 
Perspectives on Mental Health Discourse 
 
ABSTRACT 
Language in the mental health field is rich with powerful metaphors, hyperbolic phrases, 
and linguistic symbols of historical, political and social meaning. At a closer look, a dominant 
discourse rooted deep in the grounds of empirical science is revealed. In this theoretical study, 
mental health language is deconstructed using Critical Discourse Analysis and other related 
theories to locate and analyze a dominant discourse, which opens space for a non-dominant 
discourse. Postmodern theory assumes that power, entangled with and interdependent on 
powerlessness, is an absolute phenomenon, and that power abuse can be revealed through the 
study of a discourse itself. The purpose of this thesis is to locate the way power in a dominate 
discourse is practiced and spoken in common, everyday mental health language, in order to 
connect this power to an ‘Other’ discourse whose ideology and voice is marginalized. Although 
there are numerous alternative discourses, one that is gaining recognition and posing hard 
challenges toward the dominate discourse is the Recovery discourse, a language that speaks 
clearly about this place of discontinuity and oppression. As all people are subject to and 
participants of the dominant discourse (to one degree or another), this investigation aims to focus 
on how social workers participate in the dominant discourse and investigates the role of 
consciousness regarding power and oppression in therapeutic settings, posing questions about the 
role and place of social workers, regarding language use in the mental health field.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Words are not neutral (Fiske, 1994) linguistic forms of free floating thought, 
rather words are reflective of and agents to the historical, social and political practices of 
our time. Words are not arbitrary (Sheyholislami, 2001), but vehicles to that which we 
construct, and hold close, in our world of meaning. Words can locate ideologies and 
practices in a particular time and words can shift the ideologies of that time. Acting as 
powerful agents of therapeutic passage as well as representations of harm, words have the 
ability to claim as well as dislocate truth. Foucault describes his playful reaction to 
reading Borges’ unfamiliar divisions of animals, a moment when he realizes that the 
familiar order of words has been abandoned:  
. . .the laughter that shattered as I read the passage, all the familiar landmarks of 
my thought—our thought . . . breaking up all the ordered surface and all the 
planes with which we are accustomed to . . . where could they ever meet except in 
the immaterial sound of the voice pronouncing their enumeration, or on the page 
transcribing it? Where else could they be juxtaposed except in the non-place of 
language? (Foucault, 1973, p. xv-xvii) 
In using words, one has the power to create another reality, another understanding that 
may be unfamiliar. For it is in the non-place of words where text and verbal speech bring 
forth a collection of ideas of which the psyche translates and impresses itself upon. In this 
way, words create a continuity of understanding as much as words can create a 
discontinuity of understanding—a discontinuous space, perhaps of hidden meaning, of 
silence, of another interpretation—a space that challenges or debunks what is familiar or 
certain in a dominant discourse. Words can elicit cognitive dissonance or go so far as to 
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fracture thought in a way that creates disengagement or dissociation from that thought. 
Words, local to a place and time, hold power—a power which can be strengthened or 
weakened by mere repetition, representation, and distribution of those words.  
Discourse is used to discuss, interpret, understand, categorize, reference, treat, 
document, and educate within that field of knowledge. Language produces thought, truth, 
and meaning, but also has the ability to suppress each of these in a way that is justified 
and agreeable to a given community. Concomitantly, language becomes a product of 
what is intended as well as a functional part of intent. We are conditioned to see things in 
a particular way through language.  Speaking outside the dominant discourse (as Borjes 
demonstrates) of which one has been conditioned may create awkwardness, rejection, 
liberation or an inability to hear or grasp the meaning of one’s words.  For example, it is 
unlikely a social worker would refer to a client, in the middle of a clinical meeting as a 
“lunatic”. “Lunatic”, once agreeable to the ears of mental health professionals at large, is 
now, decidedly, offensive and arcane, or at the very least, not clinical.  
Around the 19th century, leading up to the mental health field as a burgeoning 
science in its own right, the word “lunatic” was a scientific word used to reference what 
we now call “people labeled with psychiatric disabilities”, “people with mental illness”, 
or not long ago, and still common in many settings (such as the clinical social work 
setting), despite many marginalized groups speaking out against being called such 
things—“mentally ill persons”.  The word “lunatic” has been used synonymously with 
other terms like “crazy”, “psycho”, “loon”, and “sicko”.  Now a derogation to its modern 
counterpart, “lunatic” was once a well-accepted, well-documented term used by 
professionals and public lay persons alike.   
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Taken from the root word “lunar”, “insanity” was understood to be a result of 
being born under a full moon, or of being an infant who slept under the light of a full 
moon. “Lunatics” were considered to be possessed by the devil. As a result, many 
procedures were instituted to help these individuals, by driving out the demonic forces in 
the body employing “medical treatments”. Ice baths were used, in which the individual 
was submerged until loss of consciousness occurred. Doctors performed “bleeding 
practices”, drawing the “bad blood” out of the body which often resulted in death.  Other 
medical treatments included massive brain shock, long periods of seclusion within 
cement celled walls where persons were often shackled and bound. These “treatments”, 
only the beginning of mental health practices, would soon be followed by other 
procedures such as lobotomies, segregation into “insane asylums”, genital mutilation, and 
other often fatal or permanently disabling “medical treatments”. This history of mental 
health practice and the treatment of persons with psychiatric disabilities can be located 
historically in the common words of that time. 
The word ‘“lunatic”’ is demonstrative of a social position as well as a political 
response to madness. Given that “lunatics” were not considered to be an adequate, or 
even acceptable, part of the work force (or society for that matter), the word also 
harbored economic meaning.  Porter (1987) describes this phenomenon, emphasizing the 
role mainstream society had on ‘othering’ those with psychiatric experiences: “The 
sequestration of lunatics was primarily an expression of civil policy, more an initiative 
from magistrates, philanthropists and families than an achievement – for good or ill – of 
the doctors” (p. 89). Porter explains that it was the request of common people that 
‘‘lunatics” be dealt with and separated from society.  In this way, an early peek at some 
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of the power dynamics in the discourse is revealed—in this instance, the influence of 
power is located in a public majority that requested separation from “lunatics”, 
perceiving them to be a flaw to the greater society. And with this discursive distance, it 
became acceptable to physically and mentally harm people who were given the label 
“lunatic”.  
There were other words used in mental health that have separated people due to 
differences that were decidedly not agreeable to society. Homosexuality was considered a 
disease, and a dominant discourse agreed that treatment for those who identified and 
came forth was necessary. “Gender identity disorder” remains a much disputed category 
of ‘othering’. Going further back into history, other labels were used to promote political 
and social biases of race, gender, sex and even political choice. “Drapetomania” was a 
label given to African American slaves who escaped their slave masters, as it was 
considered a “mental illness” to desire freedom from slavery. During the location of place 
and time that this word was used, many deeply believed that slaves were “sick” or 
genuinely “disordered” for not wanting to follow the oppressive rules of a dominant 
discourse. In this way, many words have been used to control and harm, as these words 
have become familiar, and seemingly continuous and concrete in the dominant discourse. 
What was discontinuous (slavery is immoral, unethical, cruel, horrendous, etc.) 
eventually entered into the dominant discourse, through the language of a non-dominant 
discourse, such as that of Martin Luther King, Jr.  
Words, and language as an active system, have a fundamental part in how we 
understand and connect to one another—which is perhaps why the words we use in 
mental health are constantly changing as our understanding of humanity changes.  People 
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with psychiatric disabilities are no longer seen as demonic, it is no longer ethical to 
experiment on humans—at least not using arbitrary surgical procedures on the anatomical 
brain (though one might argue the pharmaceutical industry has taken experimentation to a 
whole other level). Nor is it socially acceptable to be overtly racist in the public sphere. 
However, in the mental health field, people who identify as a gender that does not match 
their biologically-identified sex are seen as “disordered” and “abnormal”. There are over 
two hundred ways that one can be seen as “abnormal” in society today, and despite 
efforts to narrow clinical diagnostics from which we reach, the numbers continue 
multiplying, making it likely that anyone who enters the mental health system to be 
assessed will fit into some diagnostic category and return home with some label. Though 
most people who have a psychiatric label are not institutionalized, many are segregated 
from greater society, and many are discriminated against at all levels of social 
participation.  
Questioning the Importance of Language: What this means to social work 
Martin Luther King, Jr. once said “In the end, we will not remember the words of 
our enemies, but the silence of our friends” (King, 1968).  In the field of clinical social 
work, where social workers act as advocates for and clinicians to those seeking services 
for mental health problems, our place of understanding the collective trauma of those 
entering our services becomes a necessary part of the social work mission. However 
necessary, it is questionable how often clinicians take into account this collective identity 
as it impacts those seeking services. Regardless, our choice of words as much as our 
adherence to the dominant system of words (the dominant discourse or hegemony) acts as 
an expression of our own historical, social, and political position in the mental health 
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field. In other words, what we say and how we say it expresses our identity and our belief 
system, as well as our symbolic representation in the mental health field, as a whole 
collective and as individuals promoting change.  There are ways of using words to satisfy 
insurance companies, ways we speak in clinical settings that allow other mental health 
staff to understand and relate to a clinical situation, ways we relate to clients, ways in 
which we as social workers express humor and agitation, power and control by mere 
discourse.   
Discourse can be used to locate an institution of ideology and of hidden power 
that carries with it a relation of oppressing the ‘other’. By looking at the history of 
discourse, one can begin to unravel this history and begin to understand how this 
oppression still exists today, in many subtle forms that can be examined via discourse. 
The focal point becomes one of questioning where the “center” of a language resides, and 
of how, upon dislocating the center, other linguistic features emerge, perhaps foreign to 
that of our own ideology. For in this de-centering, one may understand power abuse in a 
way that was not readily acknowledged before, and choose to do something different. 
Little investigation has been done regarding language of social workers in the 
mental health field as it relates to a collective group of people labeled with psychiatric 
disabilities. Is this because the language is not our own? If it is not our own, who have we 
adopted the language from? And if we had our own mental health language, what would 
it suggest? What emphasis would it place on the individual that comes to us with reported 
struggles? Is the language we use a conscious choice? Is it a conscious process? Should it 
be conscious?  In this thesis, the language in the mental health system will be looked at as 
a way to consider power abuse that is hidden, but accessible in the immediate discourse. 
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Upon examination, some may find the discourse social workers subscribe to is an outright 
verbal assault, an epidemic of structural violence that we do not contemplate but instead 
commit (and commit to) with our mouths on a daily basis.   
To follow, there is a common assumption that social workers reject tendencies to 
‘other’ or to speak negatively about people with psychiatric labels. This assumption is 
one of many that will be considered throughout this thesis. The more accurate assumption 
may be that the social worker, referring to what identity the field of social work projects, 
makes careful statements not to pathologize the ‘other’ or discriminate against the 
‘other’, without consciousness of how the services and dominant discourse they adopt is 
an act of ‘othering’. Further, there exists a tendency to idealize said intentions, and to 
assume such intentions are met, while overlooking actions that may reveal a fine line 
between helping and harming. This thesis recognizes that although social work is 
invested in locating and working against the various ‘isms, the field itself has yet to 
formally recognize the oppression of people in the mental health system as a major and 
significant agenda of social work, located broadly in the spectrum of micro and macro 
clinical practices. 
 
 
How Discourse Will be Explored in the Following Chapters 
To pursue these possibilities, an intermingling of discourses inside and outside the 
dominant frame will be brought in. Some central questions become: What is the non-
dominant discourse? How does it differ and how is it categorized as different? How is it 
silenced? What narrative creates discontinuity in the dominant discourse? What is the 
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resistance to the common discourse and how is this resistance revealed? How do social 
workers participate in the dominate discourse? As this discourse is looked at more 
carefully, the underlying message is that consciousness of the power in discourse can 
transform social situations of oppression (Fairclough, 2000), given that when the power 
abuse is revealed, it is plausible that social workers will not only listen, but act. 
It is a well distributed statistic that 1 in 4 people meet DSM-IV diagnostic criteria 
in a given year (Kessler et al., 2005). Regardless of inclinations professionals may have 
to perceive themselves as a collective group of persons unaffected by mental health 
problems, these statistics dismantle such assumptions and reveal perhaps a false divide 
between those who are and are not meeting criteria for psychiatric disabilities. As the 
mental health language is deconstructed, and the various ways in which people are 
classified is put into question, there exists further contemplation for the role of ‘othering’ 
in the mental health field, as labeling becomes something of a cultural phenomenon— 
shared, sometimes hidden in ways that continuously question the existential space of such 
seemingly concrete representations.  
This thesis will begin with an explanation of the theoretical framework used to 
analyze and deconstruct a discourse in the mental health field. A theoretical focus on 
postmodern thought and critical discourse analysis will be present throughout. Using the 
strategic tools and philosophical underpinnings of the theories outlined in chapter two, a 
brief discussion of some of the historical elements of language in the mental health field 
will be discussed in chapter three. Chapter four will consider dominant themes in mental 
health discourse, outlining some of the social linguistic features and ways that persons 
with labels form identity in response to these themes. Once the groundwork, history, and 
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truth claims have been brought to the fore, some of the common linguistic patterns in the 
mental health field will be deconstructed in chapter five, followed by a literature review 
of existing oppression of those with psychiatric labels in chapter six. Woven in and 
emerging in various places of the thesis will be a non-dominant voice, acting as a point of 
reflection and contemplation to dislocate the center of the dominant space.  
Though there are many voices that offer this ‘other’ discourse, the emerging 
discourse of recovery, over time, has produced a challenging message to the dominant 
discourse, a message that creates discontinuity. Though there is a wide and unique range 
of individual voices that captivate the recovery discourse, this thesis will predominately 
honor the voice of Patricia Deegan, a clinical psychologist who openly speaks of her 
recovery process and of being diagnosed with schizophrenia as a teenager. While there 
are many reasons this voice in particular has been selected, one worth mentioning is that 
Deegan does not announce herself as “cured”—a claim that raises skepticism and 
dissociation within those on the other extreme end of a non-recovery, dominant 
discourse.  Rather, Deegan explains:  
One of the biggest lessons I have had to accept is that recovery is not the same 
thing as being cured. After 21 years of living with this thing it still hasn’t gone 
away. So I figure I’m never going to be cured but I can be in recovery. Recovery 
is a process, not an end-point or a destination (1993, p.10).  
Recovery . . . does not mean that one is simply stabilized or maintained in the 
community. Recovery often involves a transformation of the self wherein one 
both accepts ones limitation and discovers a new world of possibility. This is the 
paradox of recovery i.e., that in accepting what we cannot do or be, we begin to 
discover who we can be and what we can do. Thus, recovery is a process. It is a 
way of life. It is an attitude and a way of approaching the day’s challenges 
(Deegan, 1996, p.17) 
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It is through Deegan’s voice that some of the marginalized thoughts and processes 
will be revealed and utilized to understand what is included, what is excluded, and what 
role a dominate mental health language plays in ‘othering’ a collective group which has 
perhaps made itself more known through various social movements over the years—the 
antipsychiatry movement, ex-patients movement, consumer movement, etc. Deegan has a 
way in recognizing the gaps in the mental health field, and looking for ways that a 
recovery discourse and mental health discourse can join to create more continuity and 
inclusion.  
As both discourses are considered, the purpose of such demonstrations is not to 
motivate social workers to change language, necessarily, as something as transformative 
as shifting one’s discourse occurs from within and at will. Instead, this thesis poses 
questions about the nature of social work discourse, allowing curiosity to emerge about 
the consciousness of discourse and of how it reflects larger social issues. Given the 
theoretical axis of this exploration, it is safe to be clear that undertaking an investigation 
of deconstructing an already constructed discourse becomes an act of constructing more 
discourse. This is not missed, yet in following the process of questioning the symbols, the 
metaphorical meanings, the euphemistic distances kind words create while harming, the 
linguistic markers of possession and control, there is a process of deepening 
understanding while unearthing the very matter of everyday language in which we 
participate—sometimes as conscientious objectors, sometimes as fools—in which the 
space of constructing new meaning may instead serve as a bridge between two paradigms 
of thought, both working to create less harm, both seeking better ways to do just this.   
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CHAPTER II 
THEORETICAL FRAME: COLLECTIVE TRAUMA, FOUCAULTIAN POWER AND 
CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS 
There has been little criticism of the dominant discourse of the mental health field 
that has not been heavily judged or rejected, often using ad hominem arguments to 
discredit the resistance that comes in various forms of countered first-person narratives, 
research, rhetoric, and dialectics.  This small space for alternative perspective, where 
non-criticism often bulges at its own seams, is a measure of the dominant frame’s 
strength, as it is the exclusion or repression of any counter-belief that is rife within a 
given field of power.  In this chapter the theories used to examine power and resistance 
within a discourse will be introduced. The dominant discourse of mental health will 
mainly be examined through the lens of postmodernism and Critical Discourse Analysis, 
in addition to an understanding of collective trauma and group identity formation.  The 
culmination of social identity theory, critical social theory, and neo-Marxist perspectives 
add background to these theoretical approaches of investigating power and abuse as 
revealed via discourse. Below is a brief description of each theory’s significance to this 
thesis, with emphasis on how they build on or challenge one another. 
Background Theories 
Social Identity Theory  
Developed by Tajfel and Turner in 1979, social identity theory was originally 
developed as a way to understand intergroup discrimination (Tajfel, 1981). The theory 
looks at ways that groups form and maintain categories of difference, and how 
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individuals maintain multiple “social identities” that cultivate one’s self-concept as it is 
defined relationally to the group with which one identifies.  Categories, or groups, are 
implemented to simplify the complex social world one lives in, and in this relational 
agreement, individual perception is influenced by the group. There is a tendency for the 
in-group to favor and differentiate itself from the out-group, which creates a perceived 
“us” and “them” divide between social groups.  For example, a person who has been 
given a psychiatric label may, in dominant social frames, be perceived as part of the out-
group.  
Ervin Staub (1999) looks at the collective identity of groups, and how the 
individual identifies with a group and by doing so inherits the collective group identity as 
part of one’s own identity. With this, one may also inherit a history of collective trauma. 
Staub has examined this phenomenon particularly in groups that have been part of 
genocide, mass killings and collective trauma where racism and poverty are often main 
factors of oppression. Incorporating the concept of collective trauma into the group of 
persons with psychiatric disabilities, the introduction of this thesis touched on the 
collective trauma that is considered to be part of the identity of those labeled with 
psychiatric disability. In this way, one who identifies with the collective group of persons 
with psychiatric disabilities (or of persons with a particular diagnosis) experiences and 
identifies with the shame, the oppression, and attitudes and beliefs attributed to or 
experienced by that group. 
Critical Social Theory 
  An outgrowth of Marxist thought, critical social theory looks at the oppression in 
social and political institutions, with an interest in decreasing that existing oppression 
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(Leonard, 1990).  The theory is, by its own claim, essentially useless without the 
application of addressing oppression in practice. Though the theory was founded in 1923 
at the Frankfurt School (Institute of Social Research), there are many theoretical 
differences within the theory. However, as a whole, critical social theory seeks to 
determine, from a historical perspective, the relationship between people and dominant 
ideologies as they exist. Critical Social Theory, as relevant to this thesis, will be further 
contextualized as other theories are presented below.  
Logical Positivism and Marxism 
 Critical Social Theory rejects the logical positivist belief that there is absolute 
truth, or that truth claims can be made. Logical positivism was founded by the Vienna 
Circle in 1922, drawing much of its thought from Ludwig Wittgenstein who placed 
importance on the “verification principle” which states that knowledge must be 
empirically verified in order to be meaningful (Runes, 1967). Inherent in this claim is the 
premise that objective truths can be observed through sensory perception, that these 
truths are value-free, and that this valuelessness makes the empirical analytic process the 
only reliable and respectable way of understanding the causality between things.  Non-
scientific views were, therefore, not dismissed as not true but instead seen as meaningless 
to the field of knowledge. This contested religion, as well as most territory mapped in the 
social sciences, placing pressure on other knowledge fields to adopt empirical practices 
when seeking upward hierarchical mobility. 
In this way, logical positivism placed empirical science in the throne of all 
knowledge fields, claiming any subjective knowledge to be subordinate. Following 
World War II, the loftier positions of logical positivism were dropped, for one growing 
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obvious reason being that the theory itself subjected all knowledge to the “verification 
principle” with the exception of its own claims, which inevitably could not be verified 
Runes, 1960). What lingered was the enhancement of a Newtonian idealization of 
scientific knowledge, which would influence the role human behavior (as measurable) 
would have on the social sciences. 
  Extending Marxist claims of the working class having a false consciousness (an 
illusion that their work would advance and afford them the same rights as bourgeois 
society), Critical Social Theory adds that people are deluded by and conform to many 
ideologies, constructed out of power (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983).  Habermas (1971) 
pointed to this phenomenon existing in other areas, such as social sciences where humans 
were being controlled by a dominant group and a dominant interpretation of human 
existence. In response to rising trends in behaviorism, which applied the verification 
principle to human behavior, Habermas cautioned the use of stating truth claims about 
humans, and the tendency for scientific inquiry to treat humans as subjects where 
emotional experiences could be measured and determined.  
 Another contribution from Wittgenstein worth mentioning, was his “critique of 
language” in his famous Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922), which inspired what 
would become the territory of linguistic analysis, followed by his emphasis on intelligible 
and non-sensical discourse. This turn in intellectual interest would act as one of the 
precursors to postmodernism.  
Postmodernism and Deconstructionism 
In many ways the antithesis to logical positivism, postmodernism situates social 
problems in their political, historical and social context, and finds relevance between 
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these problems and their surroundings (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002).  Social interpretation, as 
a collective meaning, is a pivotal marker of postmodern thought. Thus, meaning itself in 
this process is not considered stable, as it changes with the social surroundings. As Kuhn 
posited, truth conditions are not independent of the historical paradigms in which they are 
claimed (Kuhn, 1962). Ideologies become holding environments for stated truths, readily 
present in a given discourse. Postmodernism places emphasis on the process of discourse, 
or the function of words, over the concepts of ideological constructs (the focus of critical 
social theory), and takes a different approach with linguistic analysis, deconstructing the 
terms and concepts in which scientific claims are made, often drawing attention to ways 
that humans are naturalized in the process.  
Postmodernism is the criticism of universal norms in their local context 
(Alexander, 1992), and prefers local over generalist stories, and yet still honors the 
research and findings (of a generalist nature) that support what is revealed in the 
discursive process. By looking at discourse, the postmodernist wishes to discover the 
power dynamics involved in social interaction, with particular interest in the relation of 
power and resistance between dominant and non-dominant discursive processes. 
Integrating social identity theory into postmodern thought, one can begin to examine how 
norms are constructed within groups as a strategy of separation, autonomy, and power 
play and how these norms are facilitated through discourse. A deeper understanding of 
postmodernism will be revealed below, as emphasis is placed on Foucault’s critique of 
power, an inexhaustible view that has been tailored to the constraints of this thesis.     
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Power as Construct: Attributes of Linguistic Power  
Power is the foundation, a matrix to be observed in this thesis. It is also the 
construct under investigation, as power is one of the most primitive—yet most complex 
theoretical tools utilized in acts of oppression. The chosen theoretical explanation of 
power, as a way of discovering power in mental health discourse, is mostly taken from 
Foucault’s 1978 description in his introduction to History of Sexuality.  Foucault explains 
(in much greater detail than provided here) that power exists in a matrix of combined 
forces that are organized, goal-oriented and relational tensions that exist on every level of 
social interaction.  As a force, power is exerted in multiple directions, constituting a 
fluidity of existence where continuously changing levels of power and resistance occur.  
Power is not owned by one acting agent; power is dependent on the actions, the 
discourse, the interplay of multiple agents—those resisting (passively and actively), those 
enacting, those strengthening and maintaining its goals.  To understand the approach of 
this thesis, one must grasp and hold firm this idea of power being reinforced on dominant 
as well as subjugated levels of participation. 
Foucault describes the convergence of power and knowledge, or 
“power/knowledge”, to be a joint force that holds itself in direct relation to resistance.  
Knowledge is power, and capitalism of knowledge has existed since the age of 
Enlightenment, since Descartes, making knowledge, in a metaphorical sense, the 
currency of power.  Power and knowledge are synergistic entities, as Foucault describes 
in this passage: 
Perhaps, too, we should abandon a whole tradition that allows us to image that 
knowledge can only exist where power relations are suspended and that 
knowledge can develop only outside its injunctions, its demands and its 
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interests…We should admit rather that power produced knowledge (and not 
simply by encouraging it because it serves power or by applying it because it is 
useful); that power and knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no 
power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor 
any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power 
relations.... In short, it is not the activity of the subject of knowledge that produces 
a corpus of knowledge, useful or resistant to power, but power-knowledge, the 
process and struggles that traverse it and of which it is made up that determines 
the forms and possible domains of knowledge (Foucault, 1975, pp. 27-28) 
As relationally dependent, power cannot exist without powerlessness or non-
power; both define one another. In this dynamic relationship of power and non-power, 
divisions occur, whereby patterns of discourse become included or excluded. Power and 
non-power produce a tension that constantly shifts, transforms and re-directs a dominant 
language so that the discourse itself is always changing, in sometimes small, unnoticeable 
ways and other times revolutionary shifts that transform the very ideology maintained. 
These constant shifts embody a power matrix that displays an us/them divide among 
variant discourses, plotting the demarcation of the other from the hegemonic frame (or 
ideology).  There is always the possibility of a non-dominant discourse becoming 
dominant. Examining the discourse is, therefore, one of the intricate approaches to seeing 
power, and consequently gaining consciousness of the power dynamic that serves to 
oppress groups of people. 
Foucault, having focused much attention on the social sciences’ subservience to 
the natural sciences, has also referred to power as biopower, placing emphasis on the 
naturalization of humans as subjects of science and the understanding of humans from an 
empirically driven archaeology of knowledge that produces essences, or pure 
understandings of what is “normal”. These essences become reified into constructs, such 
as the aforementioned term “lunatic” became the construct to prescribe and mistreat a 
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group of people, in the name of science, and in the separation of power and non-power. 
The normalcy given to a construct (as a concrete entity) is a false consciousness that 
allows for an elusive separation between what is normal and not normal.  This separation 
lends justification to the ways in which non-dominant groups are dehumanized, allowing 
for the oppressive acts to occur. Historically, this has been done through naturalization, or 
constructing biological reasons for defining and treating a person as an ‘other’ in a way 
that can become dehumanizing and extreme. 
Foucault’s loyalty to the bare structures and isolated features of discourse allowed 
him to make grand statements about the power abuse hidden in discourse, guiding those 
who followed him to observe the most intricate ways that control inhabits the words we 
speak and how we speak them. This was exemplified by his deconstruction of the 
language, as he unraveled the “genealogy” (a term Foucault borrowed from Nietzsche) of 
words and sentence structure, breaking down the intergenerational shifts and domination 
of words used, to discover the underlying order of how words gained power through 
common practice in the dominant discourse. Much of this required the excavation of truth 
claims held by certain words and phrases selected from the familiar ideology.  
For the purposes of this thesis though, this is where my objective departs from 
Foucault, as it is not my intention to focus solely on the autonomous function of language 
as a source of power in mental health discourse. I will not entirely deconstruct the 
scientific claims that mental health sits upon—this has been done in more lengthy 
marginalized texts. Rather, I wish to look at power in the way that he defines it 
relationally, stressing that power is not a property owned and maintained by the elite, but 
is rather a condition that emerges continuously (Mohr, 1999) on every level of social 
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interaction.  Placing emphasis and investigation on the relationship revealed within the 
discourse from a power dynamic perspective, the discourse becomes a signifier of how 
society positions itself regarding the treatment of people in the mental health system. 
A Critical Discourse Analysis Approach 
Defining CDA 
Power in discourse can be examined in multitudes of ways, one of these being 
through Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). CDA bears its origins in critical social 
theory and linguistic analysis, and has been used to analyze the power dynamics inherent 
in social relations (Fairclough, 1995; Lupton, 1992) by looking at how micro and macro 
discourses form a unified whole (van Dijk, 2003).  CDA tries to determine the 
relationship between actual text (oral and written) and the process of creating text, to 
draw connection between the use of power and language (Thompson, 2002), and to 
understand how the other is legitimized in social settings (Henry and Tater, 2002) as is 
revealed through language.  In harmony with the above theoretical descriptions, CDA is 
curious about how sources of power are maintained, reproduced, and transformed within 
the various webs of social, economic, political and historical context (van Dijk, 1988). 
Through the analysis of discourse, CDA looks at the discursive formation of common 
ideologies.  These ideologies, according to CDA, are historical by nature and form social 
action that can be interpreted and explained (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997). 
CDA asserts that discourse is learned and can be described as a way of being in 
the world that reinforces particular social identities (Gee, Khalaf & McGarty, 1990), 
emphasizing the power of learned roles in society. The main objective is to reveal these 
power dynamics as they exist in language, thereby encouraging acts of seeking social 
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justice (Foucault, 2000) in response to consciousness raised about the identified 
oppressions. There are many ways to reach this objective; CDA, being a multifaceted 
multidisciplinary approach to the analysis of language, has no unitary theoretical frame, 
though there are many diverse ways of applying CDA to a discourse, some of which will 
be demonstrated in this thesis.   
Operationally defining discourse and discursive practice 
Discourse, though it has been understood in variegated but similar ways, is 
defined for the purposes of this thesis as any linguistic exchange, oral or written, that 
demonstrates recognizable patterns of knowing in a given field of knowledge. Attention 
to discourse is inclusive of details like what is implicitly and explicitly said, how 
something is said, the historical, symbolic and metaphorical meaning of words used,  the 
function of those words in social context, what is not said, as well as the more technical 
parts of speech that include tense, tone, texture, caesura, etc.  Discursive practice, 
therefore, refers to “the overt and covert rules that govern the thoughts, actions and 
speech of various social positions one maintains in life” (Alvermann, Commeyras, 
Young, Randall, & Hinson, 1977), such as negotiations made between the roles of patient 
and doctor or the rules underlying discourse in a therapy session regarding who talks 
when, who assumes authority in a given context, etc. When looking at discursive 
practice, one may ask “according to what rules has a particular statement been made, and 
consequently according to what rules could other similar statements be made?” (Foucault, 
1969, p.27).  
Following postmodern notions of power, CDA observes that local discourse (as a 
phenomenon) overlaps and spreads to other disciplines/fields of knowledge (Fairclough, 
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1995), and is reflexively influenced by knowledge brought in by other knowledge fields. 
As power is cultivated in a field, it increases strength by forming an ideology of 
constructs that are homogenous, continuous, and that demarcate a seemingly precise 
separation between what is power/status quo (dominant discourse) and what is non-
power/other (non-dominant or subjugated discourse)—or in social identity terms, us/them 
or agent/target. To reiterate, all individuals and groups are part of constructing and 
maintaining a dominant discourse that teaches and reinforces these roles, whether they 
assume a position of power, submission, or resistance to the discourse. Paradoxically, as 
revealed in various parts of this thesis, resistance can itself be an act of strengthening the 
dominant frame, more often in an unconscious way. Other times agents who set out to 
give power to non-dominant groups gain power for themselves instead, reinforcing the 
already existing power.  This can be framed, for instance, in the notion of “harming while 
helping” and this has happened in all helping professions, including the field of social 
work.  
Applying CDA to Mental Health Discourse 
In the following chapters, theoretical strategies of CDA will be employed as a 
way to investigate the structural components of language in the Mental Health field. 
When looking at discourse, we must ask ourselves who is the agent and what is the frame 
(slant, agenda, ideology) within the dominant perspective?  Investigating discourse 
allows for those observing the power dynamics to then interpret the situation and then 
make decisions about what direction will be taken, if any, and whether one should 
assume more responsibility for the power situation.  In this way, CDA does not offer a 
solution, but rather helps to identify the problem, namely that oppression exists and is 
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constituted via discourse. It is therefore useful to identify, by looking at discourse, how 
the dominant as well as the non-dominant groups remain unconscious about the power 
dynamic, and inevitably how the power abuse occurs, as these unconscious structures 
may be a deeper underlying explanation for how a group remains oppressed. Questions 
that arise include: How is the dominant perspective being perpetuated, supported, 
reinforced, and sustained? What role does silence play in this dominant perspective? 
Given the many competing perspectives on mental health, how does a particular strategy 
or focus become superior and status quo? In other words, what truth claims does the field 
of mental health work from? And how do social workers participate in this process? 
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CHAPTER III 
CONSTRUCTING A MENTAL HEALTH DISCOURSE 
 
As Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) considers discourse itself to be a function 
of its historical context (van Dijk, 2003), it is useful to consider a selection of historical 
components that has guided shifts in the hegemonic frame, while making some concepts 
more concrete. This selection of history will not be exhaustive, but rather a snapshot of 
some of the unique tensions within the field that underlie current power dynamics of both 
dominant and non-dominant discourses.  In this initial exploration, the discourse of those 
with psychiatric labels will not be illuminated, the intention being to focus on power 
development in the field on the upper tier of hierarchy where an overt language was first 
developed. Following this brief history of discourse development, considerations on how 
participation in the dominant discourse occurs will be discussed. 
The Influence of the Natural Sciences: Mental Health’s Upward Gaze 
Empirical science, historically rooted in ideological strains of logical positivism, 
has had an impenetrable influence on the social sciences, and is uniquely pervasive in the 
dominant mental health discourse today.  As noted in the previous chapter, the 
“verification principle” laid a heavy hand on social science developments, trumpeting 
empirical knowledge (a posterior) as being superior to analytic knowledge (a priori). The 
natural sciences, through their classifications of nature (which included causal theories of 
the natural world) signified the development of taxonomies. This approach of empirical 
categorization placed a heavy economic, social and political burden on the social 
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sciences’ efforts to be included in the knowledge field where power/knowledge was 
suspended on a plane of scientific determinism. Without a significant demonstration of 
empirical data, the natural sciences were separated from the social sciences.   
A CDA concept called “the order of discourse” considers the power positions of 
one discourse to be at the hierarchical mercy of another.  The social sciences, having less 
ability to make truth claims, if any, about human behavior, were ordered as soft and 
secondary to natural science. Lewin (1951) describes the position of mental health at this 
time: “In its first steps as an experimental science, psychology was dominated by the 
desire of exactness and a feeling of insecurity” (p. 169).What followed from this order of 
discourse is that empirical science, as superior, had more symbolic resources (knowledge, 
money, force, fame, etc.), and therefore more power to create and control a dominant 
discourse (van Dijk, 2003).   
Natural and social sciences, within a power matrix, both maintained a relationship 
of tension, one in which the field of mental health often succumbed to, simultaneously 
giving power away to the natural sciences, adhering to their emphasis on a posteriori 
contributions by seeking ways to make truth claims about human behavior and 
psychiatric experiences. Doing so was not a seamless effort, as this historical depiction of 
Freud’s struggle with the language is described:  
Although Freud regarded hysteria as a disease, he clearly understood it far better 
than his language allowed him to express it. He was in a sort of semantic and 
epistemological straitjacket from which he freed himself only rarely and for brief 
periods (Szasz, 1974, p. 73).  
These limitations (as interpreted and put forth by Szasz) of a man who in many ways set 
the initial parameters as well as the language of psychotherapy, express the way molding 
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one’s ideas into the hegemonic ideology of the time, via discourse, breeds discursive 
silence, even among those who are well-equipped to speak on the subject. As no 
discourse bares origins in a vacuum, Freud was inevitably making efforts to fit his 
knowledge schema into the dominant discourse that was becoming medicalized, so that 
his own findings (theories, rather) could be endorsed as an accepted part of the mental 
health frame. Objective understanding of human behavior became a major focus of 
mental health initiatives, a focus that sought twinship from the dominant medical model.  
For the mental health field to become a respected science in its own right, a 
language needed to be developed, a distinct way of communicating knowledge generated 
by the field—knowledge that gave it a separate identity, while simultaneously allowing it 
to join forces with the powerful medical establishment from which it could draw strength. 
Mental health’s upward gaze toward the empirical sciences is best demonstrated in the 
field’s decision to implement a classification system that mirrored the medical model.   
To start, diagnostic categories were officially adopted in 1918 (Grob, 1999). The federal 
bureau of the census required data of people who were seeking and receiving mental 
health services, and this signified forces outside the mental health field itself, which 
implied promise for potential increases of symbolic resources. 
As psychiatric experiences were grouped and categorized, pressures to see and 
understand diagnosis from a medical perspective ensued. Heavily influenced by the late 
19th century work of Emil Kraepelin, whose method focused on separating the individual 
unique experience from the categorical disease, this split between human being and 
disease became a well-participated process in understanding and treating individuals 
(Runes, 1960). This shift guided perceptions of “lunacy” into directions of “illness” as 
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well as an act of removing the human from the treatment situation, allowing for harm to 
be a more acceptable practice on individuals who were seen primarily as their “disease”. 
As individuals were grouped into certain classifications, the label became the guiding 
force in understanding and treating the individual. Szasz goes on to point out the absence 
of “illness” in Freud’s earlier descriptions of the “patient”, rooting out the tendency of 
psychotherapy at the time to “squeeze psychology into behaviorism,” as he eventually 
concludes: “Thus, psychology and psychoanalysis were given only second-class 
citizenship in the land of science, their emancipation remaining contingent on the 
discovery of the physicochemical basis of 'mind' and behavior.” 
Classification as Power 
As a discursive practice, classification is itself a power move which maintains a 
system of inclusion and exclusion.  What actualized was madness and non-madness, 
sanity and insanity, or what Foucault would stress to be the fertilization and actualization 
of the “human sciences” (Mohr, 1999). Foucault (1972) underscores the power inherent 
in this process of classifying what would be or not be considered a norm, as he questions 
who has the power to create such a classification scheme.  
...who is speaking? Who, among the totality of speaking individuals, is accorded 
the right to use this sort of language (langage)? Who is qualified to do so? Who 
derives from it his own special quality, his prestige, and from whom, in return, 
does he receive if not the assurance, at least the presumption that what he says is 
true? What is the status of the individuals who – alone – have the right, sanctioned 
by law or tradition, juridically defined or spontaneously accepted, to proffer such 
a discourse? (Foucault, 1972, p. 50).  
Indeed, who was positioned and sanctioned to define “mental health” and “mental 
illness” and draw this line between “sanity” and “insanity”? A closer look at this process 
is helpful. Although psychiatry has often been noted as the agent of power in creating the 
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classification system, CDA recognizes the inherent relationship of power, and the 
necessity of looking beyond any describable body of power, or body of men. The 
discourse chosen to illustrate the dominating forces that created a language for mental 
health, therefore, is not one that invites blame toward psychiatry, but rather a discourse 
that considers the underlying complexity of this power dynamic, while resisting trends 
that oversimplify the process. In selecting discourse examples, a discursive strategy 
called “complexification” can be used to illustrate the many forces that create power in a 
dominant discourse (Macgilchrist, 2007) by neutralizing the agents of a discourse and 
focusing on the ideological supports of power/knowledge instead.  
To reiterate the forces at play, there is the tension between the social sciences and 
their upward gaze toward the natural sciences, there is the tension between diversified 
groups in the mental health field and their subservience to psychiatry as the dominating 
force to create such a classification system, there is internal tension among psychiatrists, 
and there is the tension, of a more silent type, from those who became the “subjects” of 
this developing field. Surrounding these detailed forces, there are social, political, and 
economic interests rising and falling.  
As classification went underway, there was much tension and resistance among 
the dominant perspectives within the mental health field (Grob, 1999) as to the usefulness 
and potential limitations of a categorized system. Taken from “Origins in DSM-I: A 
study in appearance and reality,” Grob describes some of the paradigmatic struggles of 
the mental health field during this time in which a language was being selected and 
created. He quotes one of the founding psychiatrists:  
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In the present state of our knowledge,” he wrote, “no classification of insanity can 
be erected upon a pathological basis, for the simple reason that, with but slight 
exceptions, the pathology of the disease is unknown. . . .Hence, for the most 
apparent, the most clearly defined, and the best understood foundation for a 
nosological scheme for insanity, we are forced to fall back upon the symptoms of 
the disease-the apparent mental condition, as judged from the outward 
manifestations. (1999, p. 423) 
 
To clarify, a decision is being made about how to classify diagnoses, as the psychiatrist 
acknowledges that no internal pathology has determined these “diseases” as biological 
occurrences, which implies a need to classify by symptoms. What underlies this 
statement is the place of assumption in these initial claims of determining psychiatric 
experiences to be biological; regardless, the founders maintain the word “disease” which 
implies a medical condition for which they have no proof. In this passage, “we” denotes 
the field of psychiatry, as this choice of words underscores their linguistic power in the 
decision making process; paradoxically, the content reveals a stance of not knowing, and 
places the role of psychiatry in a vulnerable position, in which it chooses to rely on the 
discursive formulations of natural sciences to outline pathology. This is underscored by 
the description of “insanity” as “symptoms of disease”, a notably medicalized framing of 
psychiatric disability. 
Grob (1999) explains the further complexity of the situation, namely the tension 
brought forth by other non-dominant groups of interest within the field of mental health 
who encouraged psychiatry to create a more formal classification scheme. Though it was 
a process that carried much dispute, the field came to place importance on gathering 
statistical research on behavior, an empirically driven phenomenon, which inevitably 
required categorical frames, as a way of gathering knowledge about recovery rates, and 
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later a desire to place adjacent fields of knowledge on common ground (Grob, 1999).   
This desire was supported outside of psychiatry, and encouraged by other professionals 
within the mental health field.  Intended to maintain some consistency and agreement 
about mental health presentation and treatment, a more formal classification, that of the 
1954 DSM-1 was developed by the American Psychiatric Association in addition to10% 
of the American Psychological Association who participated by survey (Grob, 1999).  
Categorical ways of knowing and speaking of mental health stabilized the field, 
granting a sense of control and mastery, as classification made the medicalization of 
mental health a structural, concrete phenomenon, rooted in science, with a discourse of its 
own. Efforts to universalize this system were well underway. This also placed assurance 
among mental health professionals, as well as those experiencing psychiatric symptoms 
for which they sought treatment. Labeling in many ways became a useful tool for sharing 
knowledge and treating psychiatric problems. In this way, psychologists, social workers 
and other mental health advocates gained power in their own domain by adhering to the 
categories put forth by psychiatry.   
This classification system would also discursively mark a symbolic act of power 
over those defined within its parameters, controlling how individuals would be viewed, 
treated and situated on an economic, political, and social terrain.  However controversial, 
the classification system, and the discourse that supports it, has come to exist in virtually 
every corner of the mental health field, and beyond, serving as the dominant language for 
mental health discourse, discursively projecting an illusion that labels are concrete and 
easily identifiable manifestations in the individual. 
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How Participation in the Dominant Discourse Occurs 
Participation in the dominant discourse occurs on many levels, each of which can 
be a conscious or unconscious process. Van Dijk (2003) sums up four ways that a 
dominant discourse controls the minds and actions of those participating in the discourse. 
The following paragraphs detail how participation occurs through acceptance, obligation, 
and limited knowledge of understanding. First, participants accept the knowledge, beliefs 
and opinion of the dominant discourse. This acceptance occurs in power relations where 
the dominant discourse is maintained via authority and trust (Nesler, Aguinas, Quigley & 
Tedeschi, 1993). Essentially, recipients of these dynamics who are part of the discourse, 
but not necessarily in agreement with the ideology, still adopt the frame.   
For example, it is not uncommon for social workers to adopt scientific claims 
about a psychiatric disability without having any basis for understanding these claims, a 
compliance that often results in misinterpretation of the data and consequently, 
misinterpretation of a person’s psychiatric experience or outcome. Another example is 
the common resistance social workers have, especially initially, when learning to use and 
implement psychiatric labels. Social workers know the people they serve are much more 
complex than the labels given to them, yet as a field, social workers agree to use the 
labels, since doing so allows for compensation as well as ongoing therapy for the person 
seeking services. This often passive agreement is yet another demonstration of the power 
matrix, and how adherence to the dominant discourse occurs.  Another example is the 
tendency of clients to accept their label, and/or to also accept their psychiatric experience 
as a biological condition that must be controlled with medication. All of these examples 
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are ways that clients, social workers and other mental health participants accept the 
dominant discourse of the field, not necessarily consciously. 
Secondly, participants are obligated, by the rules or procedures of a given 
discourse, to adhere to the dominant frame (Giroux, 1981). This obligation can be seen in 
the discursive practices held by a mental health agency, such as the use of the DSM 
classification system to diagnose and communicate with insurance companies and other 
knowledge fields that include policy, legal issues, employment, etc.  In adhering to this 
obligation, it is expected that professional language will be used in this communication so 
that other parties understand clearly the situation.  Another example would be obligations 
the client has in treatment, such as “medication compliance” or acceptance of a label 
upon entry into a mental health setting. A more subtle example is the diversity of mental 
health settings in choosing to refer to those labeled with different nomenclature, a choice 
that often reveals some political position of the agency in how it chooses to label 
“clients” as “consumers”, “mentally ill persons”, “people with psychiatric disabilities”, 
“patients”, etc.  As an agency chooses its preference of words and terminology, workers 
are often expected to comply with these agreements as part of the agency’s “culture”. 
A third way that a dominant discourse maintains participation is by not allowing, 
not exposing or not providing an alternative discourse (Downing, 1984). Though this 
phenomenon will be explored in more detail through the recovery discourse, an 
alternative discourse may be perceived as anything outside of the dominant frame, 
ranging from spiritual explanations for a perceived psychiatric experience to peer 
services that allow for an entirely different discursive practice that is based on removing 
hierarchical structures within a therapeutic setting. Not being exposed to an alternative 
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discourse may imply that one is unaware of any alternatives, and therefore may likely 
conform more readily to what one has been taught in the dominant frame. For example, 
there is evidence of people with psychiatric disabilities choosing not to take medication, 
but to instead maintain a certain lifestyle that augments health through natural practices 
of nutrition, exercise and mind/body techniques.  It is not uncommon for people being 
treated for psychosis to not have awareness of alternative treatments. 
Finally, participants may not have access to the knowledge that would imply there 
is a need to challenge the dominant discourse (Wodak, 1987). In other words, participants 
may be unaware of any tension or resistance by the part of groups within the discourse. 
They may be unaware that the dominant ideology they participate in can be harmful in 
some way. This follows the implications of the previous strategy, as in the example of 
those being treated for psychosis not having any awareness that recovery is an existing 
phenomenon and that there are strategies set forth by those in another discourse that 
outline an alternative form of treatment. Each of these methods of discourse control is 
implicated throughout the following chapter, as acts of exclusion and omission are 
identified in the dominant mental health discourse. These strategies will be discussed and 
critiqued, placing emphasis on patterns of what is being said, how it is being said, and 
rules of maintaining the discourse. Throughout the remaining chapters, common 
discourse has been selected to illustrate the particular strategies.  
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Chapter IV 
TOWARD A BIOLOGICAL DETERMINISM, THE DUAL’S DUEL AND THE 
CLINICIAN’S ILLUSION 
 
…how can we be sure that we will not find ourselves in the grip of all those over-
hasty unities or syntheses concerning the speaking subject, or the author of the 
text, in short, all anthropological categories? Unless, perhaps, we consider all the 
statements out of which these categories are constituted – all the statements that 
have chosen the subject of discourse (their own subject) as their ‘object’ and have 
undertaken to deploy it as their field of knowledge? (Foucault, 1972, p. 30) 
This chapter will focus on statements and assumptions that have become continuous 
patterns in the dominant mental health discourse. As these patterns are surfaced and 
challenged, one may continuously ask how these assumptions and statements influence 
the social worker, the clinical practice, and the person labeled with a psychiatric 
disability. Reflecting on the classification in the mental health field, it cannot be ignored 
that persons given psychiatric labels have become the objects of a knowledge field to 
which scientists, scholars, and professionals make statements and determinations about 
their experience and constitution while often having no identification with that 
experience themselves. This is one of the underlying power dynamics of the discursive 
practice, as the professional has the power to identify and put words onto the experience 
of another. Mental health discourse is predominately situated in a biomedical frame, 
where the discourse and discursive practice hinge on medical ways of knowing and 
understanding “illness”. The themes presented below build on one another, and set up a 
series of examples to be discussed at the end of the chapter. 
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Biological Determinism 
As part of the discursive structure, mental health professionals have come to use 
words that support this ideology of determining psychiatric experiences to be biologically 
based, thereby equating psychiatric diagnoses with “mental illness” and “disease”.  It is 
important to note that not all social workers claim to participate in this dominant 
ideology, yet most do work within the model, which has an influence on one’s 
perspective in multiple ways. For one, working in a medical model implies participation 
of the dominant discourse, as described in the previous chapter. For example, referring to 
psychiatric disability as a “disease” and those being “treated” as “patients” encourages 
the doctor/patient metaphor by association.  This association activates connections 
between mental health and medical practices. The discursive exchange, upon entrance 
into the mental health field, is described here: 
What do we mean when we say that a person is ill? We usually mean two quite 
different things: first, that he believes, or that his physician believes, or that they 
both believe, that he suffers from an abnormality or malfunctioning of his body; 
and second, that he wants, or is at least willing to accept, medical help for his 
suffering. The term “illness” thus refers, first, to an abnormal biological 
condition, whose existence may be claimed, truly or falsely, by patient, physician, 
or others; and second, to the social role of patient, which may be assumed or 
assigned. (Szasz, 1974, p. ix) 
Following this metaphor of “sickness”, the person becomes labeled in a way that guides 
the direction of treatment focused on becoming well again or managing the sickness. 
Allocated treatment time, the likelihood of becoming well again, the prescriptions to 
manage symptoms, all become part of the discursive exchange. “Medication compliance” 
and “non-functioning” become common phrases that position a person as a subject/object 
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to be measured against standardized behavior descriptions that typify an “ideal” 
diagnosis—one that naturalizes the psychiatric experience, and therefore the individual.  
In this classification process, something powerful occurs. Discursively, the person 
labeled is reduced to that of the object being observed and interpreted.  Professionals 
begin referring to the client as “the schizophrenic”, “the bipolar”, “the narcissist”, etc. Pat 
Deegan describes her experience: 
I was told I had a disease that was like diabetes, and if I continued to take 
neuroleptic medications for the rest of my life and avoided stress, I might be able 
to cope. I remember that as these words were spoken to me by my psychiatrist it 
felt as if my whole teenage world . . . began to crumble and shatter. It felt as if 
these parts of my identity were being stripped from me. I was beginning to 
undergo that radically dehumanizing and devaluing transformation from being a 
person to being an illness; from being Pat Deegan to being “a schizophrenic” 
(1993, p. 7). 
As psychiatric experiences are reduced to these medical ways of knowing (called 
biological reductionism) and treating “disease”, the person with the label is not looked at 
through the lens of her experience, rather, she is seen by the particulars of her label—and 
in this discursive process, the definition of her label, as well as the empirically supported 
treatment protocol of her label, becomes the substance of her, her experience, and her 
trajectory in the mental health field.   
Now certainly social workers refute this description of reducing the person to the 
label; however, upon examining the discursive practices that occur in treatment team 
settings, documentation, educational discussions, etc, the discourse reveals something 
else, perhaps not held in close-consciousness. Not only do social workers depend on 
medical terms as a way of communicating about persons with diagnoses, there is a 
tendency to fit a person’s behavior into a diagnosis (Bateson & Martz, 1979) or to equate 
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diagnosis with the person (Corrigan, 2007). Wehowsky illuminates this discursive 
process: 
The client, who is called patient, has to be ill. This may affect the therapist in 
several ways. First, he may be motivated to present the patient as worse off in his 
report so that the insurance company will pay. Secondly, his perception of the 
client may be affected by the insurance company’s rules and required system of 
diagnosis. He may shift his awareness more on the pathological and problematic 
side of the client, and less on the client’s resources and solutions. Thirdly, over 
time, the therapist’s theoretical matrix may get corroded by adjusting to standards 
which do not represent the full spectrum of intersubjective discourse of 
psychotherapy but only the accepted methods of which insurance companies think 
that they fit their economic interests best (2000, p. 244).  
While it is likely that corrosion of one’s theoretical matrix runs parallel to “burnout” and 
“hopelessness”, the effort of maintaining a separate way of knowing the client requires 
effort that often works against biological determinism, which is perpetuated at every 
angle. The administrative process of seeing the client as “ill” flows in multiple directions, 
and can encourage a “pharmacocentric view of the world” (Baldessarini, 2000). One 
study reports sociological trends revealing that an introduction of a new medication is 
positively correlated with increased diagnosis of that “illness” as well as scientific 
interest of that “illness” (Stoll, 1993).  Other studies similarly point to this trend in 
biological determinism, regardless of whether it directs the treatment toward psychiatric 
medication. In 1987, Wahl found the general public understood “schizophrenia” to be due 
to “environmental stress”; In 1999, a general survey revealed 85% cited “chemical 
imbalance” and 67% cited “genetic or inherited” to be the understanding of 
schizophrenia, in addition to stress in the environment (Link, Phelan, Bresnahar, Stueve 
& Pescolido, 1999). These attitudes and ecological patterns underlie the strengthening 
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and reinforcing nature of the dominant discourse, as Morall and Hazelton (2000) describe 
the stability of the power matrix: 
Whatever social, political or economic discordance exists in Western society, the 
system remains remarkably stable, and unremittingly committed to a capitalist 
mode of production. Moreover, although there have been serious threats to its 
dominance (e.g., through the growth of ‘complementary’ medicine, an increased 
interest in spirituality, the intellectual posturing of postmodern philosophy) 
scientific rationality persists as the core explanatory paradigm (Sokal & Briemont, 
1997). Capitalism has now a global market, and techno-scientific discoveries . . . 
that permeate virtually every culture in the world (pp.93-94) 
The Dual’s Duel: Bifurcations in the Dominant Frame 
Psychiatric labels distinguish a person’s constitution as “insane” or “sane”, 
“mentally ill” or “not mentally ill’, “bipolar” or “not bipolar”, etc.  False dichotomies, or 
what I will call “The Dual’s Duel” is the act of splitting information into two distinct, and 
often extreme poles of knowledge content, creating a situation where the participant must 
choose either ‘X’ or ‘Y’, the false dichotomy being that it is not always exclusively 
either/or, but more likely both/and and sometimes neither/nor. In short, the “middle” has 
been removed, and the discursive positioning of either/or removes theories of 
understanding behavior on a continuum.  
Perceiving a person with a label as being on one extreme pole creates a discursive 
permanence and distancing that justifies separation between “not bipolar” and “bipolar”. 
To make this polarity effective, the label must be highly definitive, oppositional, and 
defined through a relational context of ‘X’ not being ‘Y’ or ‘Y’ not being ‘X’, 
emphasizing the placement of objects, or persons, in an us/them divide. Through this 
division, a diagnosis becomes absolute and oversimplified, making the choice of one or 
the other problematic, as Theodor Adorno states: “And how comfortless is the thought 
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that the sickness of the normal does not necessarily imply its opposite, the health of the 
sick” (1974, p. 60).  
These absolute ways of knowing can be devastating for a person who has been 
labeled, as it reinforces an act of giving power away, as described here: 
Before diagnosis, there was a continuity of knowing for Jim and Cathy. Through 
diagnosis there is experience of indisputable illness, declared by ‘a knowing that 
knows’. The diagnosis is experienced as knowing that cannot be challenged, a 
knowing that highlights a dissonance within ‘self’. The distress caused by this 
knowing is distinct from what may be happening to ‘the self’ as a result of illness. 
It results from that ‘pure knowing’; from hearing a medical term that is taken as 
absolute and irrefutable ‘fact’(Hayne, 2003, p. 725). 
The “knowing that knows” in this passage represents the power inherent in the dominant 
discourse that claims, with absolute certainty to know what is happening in the person. 
As Hayne describes, this absolute fact of “indisputable illness” fractures the 
understanding in the individual, creating a dissonance of not knowing or trusting the 
“self” anymore, and instead giving understanding away to the professional. Once more, 
this marks an exchange of power where dominant and non-dominant forces support and 
participate in strengthening a dominant discourse. 
The infamous Dual’s Duel exists in other planes of mental health knowledge. 
Eisenberg (1995) has criticized the highly charged ‘either/or’ discourse that psychiatric 
disability is either biological/’no one’s fault’ or psychological/’caused by sociological 
factors.  This divide has become a standard pattern within the dominate discourse. To 
support this, studies show there is a social tendency for western culture to blame internal 
disposition rather than external conditions (Ross, 1997). The nature/nurture debate, aside 
from being a continuous lesson in history’s discontinuity, is the ongoing, ever-exhausting 
oversimplification of the scientific and social fields of knowledge where nature currently 
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prevails, and continuously manifests itself in ways of understanding and discovering 
psychiatric disabilities. 
The Clinician’s Illusion 
“You are at a critical juncture, a very important time. The professionals are telling 
you that you are a schizophrenic. Your family and friends are beginning to refer 
to you as ‘a schizophrenic.’ It is as if the whole world has put on a pair of warped 
glasses that blind them to the person you are and leaves them seeing you as an 
illness. It seems that everything you do gets interpreted through these warped 
glasses (Deegan, 1993, p. 9).  
The Clinician’s Illusion is a tendency for practitioners to assume that patients remain 
“seriously ill” when outside of the clinical care setting (Cohen & Cohen, 1984). This 
illusion can be the result of seeing extreme cases of a diagnosis as typical for everyone 
who has the diagnosis, even when the presentations vary. Both biological determinism 
and the dual’s duel support this illusion. Diagnostic labels become a mark of permanence, 
discursively set by words like “chronically” and “persistently” and further indicated by 
words like “always” and “never”, etc.  
Diagnostic labels may be perceived as static and unchanging (Anderson, 1991; 
Kashima, 2000). The use of labels, as a discursive practice, challenges the reality that 
people actually do move beyond their psychiatric experiences, one obvious reason being 
that there is no clinical practice that exercises the discursive removal of that label at the 
end of treatment. This permanence may also lend to the idea that a label indicates 
something is fundamentally wrong. Studies suggest that even after a person improves in 
treatment (Link et al., 1997), the values and beliefs about a given diagnosis remain a part 
of how the person is perceived, and the person’s diagnosis becomes a static part of their 
identity.  
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This can be played out when clinicians fall into the common habit of using all-or-
nothing thinking when applying a label. From a more technical perspective, Haghighat 
and Littlewood (1995) employed a sociolinguistic analysis of the word “schizophrenic”. 
They explained that placing a modifier before a noun linguistically situates that modifier 
(“schizophrenic”) to be part of the noun’s (the person’s) constitution.  For example, 
“schizophrenic patient gives an impression of permanency that patient having 
schizophrenia or patient with schizophrenia may not” (p. 408). In addition, the suffix “-
ic” can be semantically loaded. The authors compare “schizophrenic” to “syphilitic” and 
explain that both are indicators of “an unusual degree or amount” of the given nominal 
device (“schizophrenia”).  
When a person begins attaching their own understanding (bias, beliefs, etc.) of 
schizophrenia to the label, other emotions and values get loaded into the word. The 
authors also explain how the use of the suffix –ic can create a distancing effect, whereby 
using an adjective (“schizophrenia” as in symptom) as a noun (“schizophrenic” as in 
person) “may rob the individual of his other aspects as it subsumes personhood and 
agency into illness” (p. 409). “Having” schizophrenia and “being schizophrenic” then 
becomes crucial to individual identity as well as the treatment process from a clinical 
perspective. 
Thematic Patterns of Discourse 
This section illustrates examples of the patterns described above. To start, one 
social worker describes a person with a psychiatric disability: “Max is a 37-year-old man 
who is paranoid and delusional” (Berzoff, Flanagan & Hertz, p. 273). Max, instead of 
experiencing paranoia and delusions discursively becomes that of his symptoms—
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enacted by the word “is”, a process that takes power away from the individual and 
submits him to the matter of his symptoms. Another tendency, loading one’s own beliefs 
and values into the diagnosis, is illustrated by the same social worker: “Christine is a 27-
year-old woman whose speech is frequently incoherent and whose affect appears silly 
and inappropriate” (p. 273). This social worker, while recognizing some of the personal 
attributes of Christine initially, describes her affect as “silly” and “inappropriate”, 
descriptions that signify value-judgments without clinical relevance, positioning the 
social worker in a power position of deciding what is or is not appropriate.  
The following quote illustrates tendencies to homogenize individuals in a given 
labeled category:  “Narcissists feel justified in their claim for special status, and they 
have little conception that their behaviors may be objectionable, even irrational” (Millon, 
1981, p. 167). There is confidence in the statement above, as there are no indicators such 
as “some” “narcissists” or even “it is typical for…”  The definitive nature of the 
statement makes it so that all narcissists feel this particular way all the time, which 
homogenizes the experience of narcissism and attributes permanence to the individual’s 
psychiatric experience. Further, “little conception” of one’s pervasively negative 
behaviors suggests it is unlikely for persons in this category to ever gain enough 
awareness to actually improve their negatively valued situation. The framing of the 
diagnoses is a framing of hopelessness, and is an exaggeration of what it means to have 
narcissistic personality disorder.   
Here is another: “Most borderlines exhibit a single, dominant outlook or frame of 
mind, such as a self-ingratiating depressive tone, which gives way periodically, however, 
to anxious agitation or impulsive outbursts of inappropriate temper or anger” (Millon, 
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1981, p. 349). Value-laden statements are a product of the reified label: a person labeled 
with “borderline personality disorder” becomes “the manipulative, easily angered child” 
instead of a person experiencing extreme states of emotion that may result in a tendency 
to act out of fear and with a difficulty of managing that fear. Stating that “borderlines” 
have a dominant outlook of “self-ingratiating depressive tone” is pejorative and an 
oversimplification of one’s day-to-day experience.  The author goes on to suggest that the 
only time this tone changes is when it “gives way” to another negatively valued 
experience.  In short, Miller confines a person with this label to the parameters of having 
only negative experiences. The human condition is much more varied than that, and 
people labeled with personality disorders can experience an array of emotionality, none 
of which is permanent, and all of which has potential to be transformed.  When values 
like these are attributed to the label, what happens to the hopefulness of social workers 
when working with persons who have these labels? 
The clinician’s illusion is a demonstration of hopelessness in the mental health 
field. The question becomes what does it mean to perceive the client as diseased? What 
happens when we call a person by a given label? How likely is the individual to be 
hopeful about “recovery” if told one has a “biological disease”?  A psychotherapist, 
Nancy McWilliams, in her appeal to the scientific notions held within the dominant 
discourse, states: 
 …the pervasive message [is] that psychotherapists should not be trying to 
understand and mend the broken heart, or heal the tortured soul, or promote the 
acceptance of painful realities. Instead we should be trying to medicate, manage, 
reeducate, control, and correct the irrational behavior of people whose suffering is 
inconvenient to the larger culture (2005, p. 140).  
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The Influence of Dominant Themes on Collective Identity 
Following the aforementioned themes, it is useful to reflect on how these impact 
the person being labeled in the mental health field from a group identity perspective. 
Regarding biological determinism, specifically, one study found that the general public, 
when asked to rate the likelihood of recovery for those who have a “mental illness” that is 
biologically based versus psychologically based, a significant number of participants 
perceived that the psychologically based “mental illness” is more likely to be cured and is 
significantly less disabling (Lam, 2005).  Labels that are understood to be biologically-
based are positively correlated to prejudice, fear, and social distance (Read, Haslam, 
Sayce & Davies, 2006). In addition, perceiving one’s psychiatric disability as a biological 
condition may lead to feelings of shame (Kessler et al., 1996). 
When a person enters treatment, one officially, whether or not consciously, 
accepts a label, and this label, by association, activates difference between groups (Mohr, 
1999). The individual is able to identify with “mental illness”, assumes the role of the 
‘other’, and takes this into one’s personal identity. What becomes part of that label is the 
value-laden attribution, even if not overtly disclosed in the therapeutic relationship, 
attached to the person, as these attributions can be communicated by the public, through 
the media, through online access, etc.  When participating in the dominate discourse, the 
linguistic apparatus of separating those with diagnoses from the general population 
becomes a bidirectional process. As professionals see a person labeled as different or as 
‘other’, the person labeled comes to expect those external to her to perceive her as 
different and begins to see herself as different. This perception strengthens the divide 
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between those labeled and those not, increasing the feeling of difference and the 
anticipation of rejection.  
Labels have the power of eliciting negative beliefs about the person that can have 
damaging consequences (Link et al., 1989). Beliefs become personally relevant and 
potentially very harmful to self esteem (Rosenfield, 1997; Link et al., 2001), social 
interactions (Farina et al., 1968), social network ties (Link et al., 1989; Perlick, 
Rosenheck, Clarkin, Sirey, Salahi & Struening 2001), and quality of life (Rosenfield, 
1997). This can create conscious awareness of the power dynamic in therapeutic 
relationship as well as the negative attributes being placed on the person, as Deegan 
describes: 
Professionals' reification of the diagnosis of schizophrenia was oppressive 
because it subjugated my humanity such that everything I did was interpreted as 
part of my psychiatric disability. . . I am describing the arrogant and 
unapologetically clinical gaze that captures me, re-interprets me and hands me 
back to myself as damaged goods; disabled; off-spec; not-right; broken-brained; 
neuro-chemically imbalanced; genetically defective; a special person with special 
needs, requiring special services in segregated places (2004, p. 2). 
As negative attitudes and beliefs are perpetuated, a person labeled becomes aware 
of a gap between the self and other (Crawford, 1994), followed by a tendency to compare 
the self to what is “normal” and a desire to see the self as “normal” (Pickens, 1999), 
where the stereotypes placed on the identified group create more feelings of social 
distancing. Studies reveal that these stereotypes can be viewed to be as distressing as the 
psychiatric symptoms themselves (Hocking, 2003). As one becomes more aware of social 
separation, feelings of shame and humiliation can become internalized (Heatherton, 
Kleck, Hebl, & Hull, 2000). Regarding internal group dynamics, comparisons within a 
diagnostic group (both heterogeneous and homogeneous) can occur. Finlay and Lyons 
 45 
(2001) found in-group downward comparisons among persons diagnosed with 
schizophrenia, supporting studies that suggest a tendency to compare the self to others 
who fare worse, in effort to feel better about one’s situation. This comparison is an 
example of how a dominant discourse of ‘othering’ is supported inside a non-dominant 
exchange.  
Patterns of Harming When Attempting to Help 
Patterns of harming when attempting to help can be located in the dominate 
discourse. In one study, Parker and Aggleton (2003) focused on the social process of 
negative attitudes and beliefs among the general public. They reported that individuals 
who identify as being part of the in-group fear a particular psychiatric label and seek to 
determine differences that separate them from the out-group (those who have labels). 
This is perhaps best illustrated in a case example of a social work student who “was so 
fearful that her own anxiety was a sign of schizophrenia that she began calling in absent. 
When confronted by the supervisor, she tearfully stated her fears” (Miller & Mason, 
2006, p. 80).  
Though the authors use the above example to teach supervisors training skills 
with developing social workers, they (perhaps unintentionally) illuminate the us/them 
divide, and go on to encourage that fears can be attenuated once students understand “the 
biological nature of the disease”. This process, however unintentional, is what Parker and 
Aggleton (2003) describe as a social process whereby those who fear the diagnosis 
maintain control by creating social distance between themselves and those diagnosed.  
Another example of harming while helping occurs on a more ethnocentric level 
where professionals assume, for example, that the DSM criterion of diagnoses is 
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applicable to other populations outside the culture in which it was produced: “The World 
Psychiatric Association has recently initiated a global program against stigma and 
discrimination because of schizophrenia” (Sartorious, 2002, p. 1470). This statement 
maintains an interesting placement of linguistic terms. Initiating a program against 
“stigma” “because of schizophrenia” can be read in many ways, and suggests, perhaps 
unintentionally, a direction of blame toward schizophrenia—as a symptom, a label—it is 
unclear. Aside from the linguistic connotations, the assumption that schizophrenia is a 
global issue positions the dominant discourse to assert knowledge and power over other 
non-dominant and perhaps non-knowing populations.  
Another similar example of ethnocentrism, offered by Bentall, is the World 
Health Organization’s “conclusion that the incidence rate of schizophrenia . . . does not 
vary across the world. They therefore inferred that there must be a uniformly distributed 
liability to schizophrenia and that ‘This liability must have a genetic basis.’” (2003, p. 
124). What is discontinuous in this statement? Bentall goes on to point out other studies, 
more anthropologically-based, that reveal “schizophrenia-like psychoses are less 
common in non-Western societies than in the developed world” (p. 126), and offers 
explanations of schizophrenia as a “stress-related disorder”.  
 Beyond categorizations of a global nature, other ways of harming while 
attempting to help are more local. In Corrigan’s book Don’t Call Me Nuts: Coping with 
Stigma of Mental Illness, he describes a “stigma-busting presentation” strategy that 
teaches those with diagnoses how to share their personal story, as modeled in Kyle’s 
story: 
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Hi. My name is Kyle. . .and I’m here to tell you about a disease I have called 
bipolar disorder or manic-depression. The disorder I have, when it’s untreated, 
can cause severe mood swings. The actual disorder occurs in the brain and neuro-
pathways. Illnesses like depression, manic-depression, and schizophrenia are 
referred to as neurobiological brain disorders (2001, p. 263). 
Kyle limits his understanding to a story of biological reductionism. Corrigan’s book, 
supported by NAMI (National Alliance of Mental Illness), introduces other ways of 
“reducing stigma”, which on a deeper reflection, may be seen as harmful on micro and 
macro levels, especially where there is an intermingling of power and non-power groups 
of discourse. NAMI has been largely funded by Eli Lilly (a pharmaceutical industry 
invested in global strategies to increase drug revenues) and serves to promote its 
biological messages that claim depression, bipolar disorder, and other psychiatric 
experiences are “diseases” to be treated pharmacologically. NAMI, a supporter of the 
Mental Health Act of 1995, gave police the right to force individuals into mental health 
clinics against their will (Sayce, 2000). NAMI teaches families and individuals with 
labels that the psychiatric experiences are biologically based, and they have been known 
to distribute pamphlets on ways to strategically coerce individuals to stay on medications 
that often are harmful or producing side effects that are worse than the psychiatric 
symptoms themselves. In this way, NAMI maintains an extreme pole of seeing and 
treating psychiatric experiences as biologically-based, a position to be explored in more 
detail in chapter five.  
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CHAPTER V 
DISCONTINUITY: DECONSTRUCTING A DOMINANT  
MENTAL HEALTH  LANGUAGE 
 
I have undertaken, then, to describe the relations between statements. I have been 
careful to accept as valid none of the unities that would normally present 
themselves to anyone embarking on such a task. I have decided to ignore no form 
of discontinuity, break, threshold, or limit (Foucault, 1972).  
The goal of this chapter is to locate the discontinuity in the dominate discourse—the 
spaces of inconsistency that, upon identifying, allow for another truth to emerge in 
another discourse. To locate these spaces of discontinuity where an ‘other’ has been 
silenced, marginalized, disavowed, it becomes useful to deconstruct the patterns and the 
existing claims of continuity. Continuity is seen as that which appears to be stable, 
consistent, and agreed upon. CDA looks at what arguments and argumentation schemes 
are used to enact exclusion, discrimination, suppression and exploitation of the other 
(Wodak and Reisigl, 2003). These and other forms of maintaining a dominate discourse 
will be considered in this chapter by considering what is discontinuous and offers another 
explanation or truth to that of the dominant discourse.  
Label Reliability and Construct Validity 
To begin, one of the more challenged discontinuities is that of labeling reliability 
and construct validity. Labels do not have a history of being continuously reliable or 
valid in their definition and construction, which becomes problematic since psychiatry 
depends on the medicalization of mental health, and more specifically on the integrity 
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and consistency of the diagnostic labels which link these behaviors to illness (McPherson 
& Armstrong, 2006). This dependency creates a direct need for power over any other 
alternative approach to mental health problems that may challenge their position as well 
as the benefits that position reaps (by way of the pharmaceutical industry, as well as 
insurance companies).  
Studies point to trends in label consistency and inconsistency as dependent upon 
social processes within the mental health field (McPherson & Armstrong, 2006) as well 
as the origins of categorization relative to psychiatric ideology and current social trends 
(Grob, 1991) and having less to do with the diagnostic principle of the illnesses 
themselves.  Though the DSM has remained a basic tenet of the mental health field, 
reliability has remained a steady issue that pushes against its existence. Though mental 
health professionals intellectually understand that labels are constructs and not entities, 
the discourse that has been reviewed thus far has suggested that labels are framed in a 
way that makes them concrete, a part of the individual, and consistent in the eye of the 
observer (or professional). 
In one study that looked at reliability of the DSM-III-R, there was a 68% to 72% 
reliability agreement (Williams, Gibbons, First, Spitzer, Davies & Borus, 1992). One of 
the most publicized studies was developed by Rosenhan (1973). In this study, eight 
“pseudopatients” were advised to apply for admission to different psychiatric hospitals, 
and to complain of auditory hallucinations (stating the words they were hearing were 
“empty”, “hollow”, and “thud”). Once admitted into the hospital, the pseudopatients were 
advised to cease reporting any hallucinations and assume their typical behavior. The 
results were piercing: some pseudopatients were kept in the hospital for up to fifty-two 
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days, and it was common for mental health professionals to repeatedly perceive and 
document their “normal” behavior as “disordered”. Some mental health staff made verbal 
assumptions about pseudopatients that revealed a perception of them as not only disabled 
“mentally” but cognitively impaired as well. The pseudopatients experienced devaluing 
as a result of their treatment in the hospitals. Further, in spite of each pseudopatient 
presenting with the same exact “symptoms”, diagnoses were not entirely consistent.  
Other inconsistencies of diagnostic labeling have become more public, centered 
on human rights issues, as reviewed in the first chapter regarding biases and social 
control of sexual identity and preference, race, gender, etc. In light of these 
inconsistencies, studies continuously point to diagnostic categories as being clinically 
useful, but not valid (Kendall & Jablensky, 2000). Criticisms of diagnoses becoming “out 
of hand” are common, as described by this medical doctor:  
The DSM currently admits close to 300 mental and behavioral disorders. Given 
that clinical appearances forge diagnoses, a particular patient can satisfy the 
criteria for several disorders and many dissimilar patients can meet criteria for the 
same disorder. Because the manual fails to identify what underlies the 
symptomatic expression of a condition, it cannot suggest intelligible principles 
relating one disorder to another or illuminate why some of them bunch together. 
For these reasons, faith in the criterion method has gradually faltered” (McHugh, 
2005, p. 2536). 
This criticism is supported by clinical disparities in awareness of particular bipolar 
symptoms, for example, that contribute to misdiagnosis (Ghaemi, Ko, & Goodwin, 
2002). Diagnosis can take an average of 7 years before some individuals are properly 
diagnosed and “treated” (Ghaemi, Boiman, Goodwin, 2000). Further, there are blurred 
boundaries between trauma and bipolar disorder, as researchers indicated there is a broad 
relationship between both (Levy, 2007). To complicate matters more, alternative 
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explanations such as nutritional deficits, Lyme Disease, Korsakoff’s, Wilson’s Disease, 
brain tumors, Celiac Disease, neuroendocrine disorders, etc, are often overlooked by the 
clinician who is not trained to recognize or make distinctions between what is physical 
and what is mental, a distinction that has become a confusion on multiple levels.  
Clinical Discontinuity: Examples of Common Fallacies 
 Turning toward more clinical descriptions, the following passage is taken from a 
social work text that has been written for the training purposes of master’s-level social 
work students, and will be used to deconstruct a number of issues: 
Schizophrenia is a syndrome that alters a person’s capacity to sustain coherent, 
reality-based thoughts, and that creates a disturbance in a person’s affective life 
and behavioral patterns. For those afflicted, it can be experienced as a painful 
struggle for emotional survival. Although the nature vs. nurture debate about the 
cause of schizophrenia has raged for decades, almost everyone now agrees that 
biological vulnerabilities are at the core of schizophrenic disorders. In the absence 
of brain dysfunction and/or hereditary predisposition, social and psychological 
factors alone have not been shown to produce schizophrenia (Berzoff, Flanagan, 
and Hertz, 2000, p. 271) 
 
While there are multiple discursive aspects of which can be deconstructed in this 
passage, perhaps the most discussed strategy thus far has been the false dichotomy. Hertz 
invites the nature/nurture debate into her description as a way to acknowledge competing 
theories of schizophrenia etiology. She accepts the bifurcation, and participates in the 
dominant discourse by accepting the extreme pole of biological explanations regarding 
schizophrenia, thereby determining schizophrenia to be a biological disease. 
As Hertz excludes explanations outside the dominant discourse, she coerces the 
reader to also accept biological explanations by making claims that ‘almost everyone 
agrees’ there is a biological explanation for schizophrenia.  Who is “almost everyone”? In 
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this statement, Hertz commits the ad populum (“to the people”) fallacy of asking readers 
to believe her conclusion because “everyone” else agrees to biological explanations. 
Absent of any supportive evidence provided by Hertz, it is assumed the readers will 
uncritically accept her position as the truth. In this way, the social worker uses her 
authority instead of any intelligible explanations about schizophrenia, a strategy that is an 
unfortunate (yet common) part of learning texts, and a deprivation to educational 
environments that present as spaces for critical thought. Students, in accepting these 
claims, commit the appeal to authority error of believing claims put forth by social 
workers who are in no position to make such claims, without supportive scientific 
documentation. 
Another way social workers demonstrate participation in the dominant frame is in 
using the “appeal to ignorance”.  Hertz explains that because no evidence supports 
trauma or socially informed explanations of schizophrenia it must be the case that 
biology explanations are true. This is a sweeping statement that has been used to advance 
the dominant discourse, the driving theory being that biological explanations are the only 
explanation, a claim worth deeper investigation where one might find, hidden under the 
discursive practice, another truth, another voice, and perhaps another reason that ruptures 
the continuity of biological determinism.  
First, there is a tendency for scientific suggestions and findings to be 
misinterpreted. While twin studies do report findings of neurological ‘soft signs’ in 
schizophrenia diagnoses (Neithammer, Weisbrod, Scheisser, Grothe, Maier & Peter, 
2000), scientists admit that no identified causal alleles have been found—in other words, 
no “schizophrenia gene” has been located (Hamilton, 2008; Harrison and Weinberger, 
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2005; Owen, Williams, O’Donovan, 2004).   Furthermore, genetic researchers state that 
the discovery of causal genes for psychiatric illness is highly unlikely (Kenler, 2005). 
Other theories of brain abnormalities have been suggested; for example, studies on brain 
structures such as that of the frontal cortex and limbic system have been implicated in 
schizophrenia. However, other studies find that these “brain abnormalities” occur in 
“normal” populations as well as various other neurological and psychiatric conditions 
(Cleghorn, Zipursky & List, 1991; Garza-Trevino, Volkow & Cancro, 1990), which acts 
to discredit previous claims. 
To add, perceiving schizophrenia as a biological disease creates a permanence 
truism; in other words it can perpetuate the belief that those with labels will never recover 
from or be without psychiatric symptoms once labeled (as discussed in the Clinician’s 
Illusion). The purported truism also holds a discursively intuitive claim that people with 
psychiatric diagnoses are biologically inferior. For what has led us to believe, other than 
the dominant discursive positioning of linguistic categories, that identical twin studies are 
an absolute indication of genetic disposition? One cannot claim a genetic disposition 
through heritability studies; one can only speculate or hypothesize.  
Looking once more at the remainder of the above passage, Hertz claims that “in 
the absence of brain dysfunction . . .social and psychological factors alone have not been 
shown to produce schizophrenia” (Berzoff, Flanagan, and Hertz, 2000, p.  271). This 
statement is unclear, and seems paradoxical. Hertz has made the claim that schizophrenia 
is a biological condition, but then complicates, or perhaps equivocates using the phrase 
“brain dysfunction” by considering it a symptom, an etiology, as well as a definition of 
schizophrenia. The statement, in its whole form, is a question-begging argument, where 
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Hertz has inserted the answer (brain dysfunction) into the question (of schizophrenia as a 
brain dysfunction) after already laying down her premise that schizophrenia is a 
biological disorder supported by theories of brain dysfunction. Once more, this social 
worker is asking the reader to accept her conclusion without providing any real evidence. 
Further, what authority or evidence exists that necessitates a direction toward finding 
what “produces” a psychiatric disability? The process becomes circulatory and not rooted 
in educational substance. Hertz’ position is perhaps more revealed throughout her 
continuous referencing of the person diagnosed with schizophrenia as “the 
schizophrenic”.  
Hertz’ exclusion of alternative information, in the immediate space of making 
biological claims, overlooks the greater macro issues of who funds scientific research, 
what views are supported that invariably become public information, etc., despite the 
author’s eventual inclusion of other possibilities. In short, many of her claims abandon 
the notions of what a social worker claims to seek in explanations of psychiatric 
presentations— namely environmental, cultural, familial factors that contribute to 
alternative ways of considering psychiatric disability.  
There are more dated theories, such as intergenerational transmission of collective 
harm, of Bowenian understandings, of trauma informed theories, stress theories, 
socioeconomic theories, all of which present additional problems when attempting to fit a 
unique individual into a particular constructed frame. Herman (1997) suggests that 40 to 
60 per cent of individuals who receive mental health services have a history of childhood 
physical and/or sexual abuse. Environmental contributions to psychiatric disability are 
often overlooked, as these understandings have a tendency to be grouped into an extreme 
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category of placing blame on the family, a taboo subject which groups like NAMI 
effectively polarize, adding weight to biological reductions of understanding.  
What these findings suggest is an epidemic of not only dominant discursive 
practices, but the risk of asserting imperialistic notions used to describe and treat 
individuals well beyond our capacity of understanding. More universal studies reveal that 
persons diagnosed with schizophrenia who live in undeveloped countries have a better 
outcome due to family support, tolerance in the community, and work opportunities 
(Jablensky, Sartorius, Ernberg, Anker, Korten, Cooper, et al., 1992) as opposed to more 
developed countries that rely on psychopharmacology. However, there is much inferred 
in such statements. The point is not to dislodge the biological assumptions, but rather to 
open space for other competing assumptions that have been excluded from the dominant 
discourse.  Interestingly, just seven pages prior to the claims about schizophrenia in the 
social work manual, the authors coach students on the humanism of each individual: 
…we are not necessarily different than or separate from those who are labeled 
with mental illness. We all have elements of suffering and disharmony in our 
lives. Biological, psychological, and social forces will combine to determine 
where we fall in a given moment along the continuum from mental illness to 
mental health. As Harry Stack Sullivan (1940) noted: ”In most general terms, we 
are all much more simply human than otherwise; be we happy and successful, 
contented and detached, miserable and mentally disordered or whatever” 
(Berzoff, Flanagan, and Hertz, 2000, p. 264). 
 
In this passage, the authors describe psychiatric experiences as being on a 
continuum, and interestingly one that can fluctuate ‘in a given moment’.  This 
perspective of a mental health continuum, as more inclusive and continuous, dismisses 
the permanence engendered in biological claims and frees the individual form discursive 
patterns of hopelessness. It suggests the possibility that persons labeled with 
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schizophrenia also have room on the spectrum for experiences other than value-laden and 
deterministic claims of a “painful struggle for emotional survival”. It creates the 
possibility that persons with this label may go on to live schizophrenia-free lives.   
Granting the authors some credit for their efforts of inclusion, this humanistic 
approach coincides with scientific findings supported by other competing claims. 
However, in the seemingly benign message there lies yet another contradiction. As the 
authors quote Sullivan, the quote seems to distort their initial efforts as placing those who 
are “miserable and mentally disordered” on the continuum, once again laying harsh value 
judgments on one’s pathologized constitution, linguistically placing permanence on 
“mentally disordered” while grouping this homogenized label with “miserable”, all of 
which may negatively influence a new student, as Deegan speaks of the underlying power 
the authors and the student both have: 
When we make the transition from being a student to being a professional 
clinician, our culture and human service grant us a broad range of power over the 
lives of people who are in distress. With that power comes enormous 
responsibility and great risk. . . I have found myself needing to ask some difficult 
questions about the power granted to clinicians: about the way we assume this 
power as privilege; about how our use of this power can erode our values and 
ideals; about how our use of this power can systematically disempower those we 
are supposed to be serving; about how it can oppress and sometimes hurt the 
people who come to us for help (1990, p. 302). 
Moving on from Hertz’ passage, participation in the dominant discourse, while 
accepting a medical model frame of clients as described above, can easily lead one to 
maintain a pervasive hopelessness about those diagnosed, as one psychiatrist describes 
his experience of being a “label maker”: 
Back in my office, I watched Miss B. struggle to make sense of the simplest of 
my questions. Her affect was flat, and her eyes were forlorn. She was being 
bombarded with stimuli that only she could see and hear. I felt pangs of sorrow 
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for her and her family as I began fashioning her diagnostic label, shaping her view 
of herself for years to come. My pen wrote “Schizophreniform Disorder.” It was 
as if a scene from The Scarlet Letter was playing out before me: “They have 
doomed Mistress Prynne . . . for the remainder of her natural life, to wear the 
mark of shame upon her bosom.”  I labeled her for medical accuracy in my 
charting, and I labeled her for the insurance company that pays for her treatment. 
But I had a hard time believing that my labeling was going to be of any 
therapeutic value (Raj, 2005, p. 687).  
 
This level of hopelessness, as the psychiatrist describes his assuredness that Miss 
B. will move into a further decline, is not uncommon. Raj explains his participation in the 
dominant discourse begrudgingly. His sense of control and dominance, with regard to 
Miss B’s future, is remarkably present as he talks of “fashioning” and “shaping her view 
of herself”. It is not that he wishes this for her or that he even wants to participate in 
delivering such a prognosis; rather Raj believes that Miss B. is doomed. In an earlier 
passage, Raj describes some of the discursive practices that support this stance:  
Mental illness is more than a diagnostic label. It is an identity label. Patients with 
schizophrenia do not just have schizophrenia, they are schizophrenic. The 
outward appearance of a schizophrenic may be completely normal and 
unchanged, while the inner workings of his or her mind is a kaleidoscope of 
twisted reality (Raj, 2005, p. 687).  
 
Perhaps this is an ideal example of how the dominant discourse harms, for Raj has 
begun to see those labeled with schizophrenia as their labels and groups them into 
one ideal type of homogeneous presentation and outcome. More poignant, he does 
this consciously, as if there is no other alternative way of knowing. Raj also 
painstakingly admits that these labels cause harm and are often misused: 
Sadly, mislabeling and overlabeling have been major issues with far-reaching 
implications. I routinely encounter patients who are hospitalized carrying their 
diagnostic labels like proverbial crosses—labels created in haste but indelible 
over time. These labels, regardless of accuracy, end up dictating the treatment and 
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tyrannizing the self-image of the patience they were supposed to benefit (Raj, 
2005, p. 687).  
Raj not only spells out clearly how labels can harm, but he also demonstrates how 
powerful the dominant discourse can be, not only toward those with labels, but 
toward his own perception as a psychiatrist. What is not included in the dominate 
perspective is the prevalence of recovery, a message that is noticeably missing in 
Raj’s language as representation of the dominant discourse. As one person given a 
label states:  
Recovery has only recently become a word used in relation to the experience of 
psychiatric symptoms. Those of us who experience psychiatric symptoms are 
commonly told that these symptoms are incurable, that we will have to live with 
them for the rest of our lives, that the medications, if they (health care 
professionals) can find the right ones or the right combination, may help, and that 
we will always have to take the medications. Many of us have even been told that 
these symptoms will worsen as we get older. Nothing about recovery was ever 
mentioned. Nothing about hope. Nothing about anything we can do to help 
ourselves. Nothing about empowerment. Nothing about wellness (Mead & 
Copeland, 2000, p. 1). 
 
What the voice of this non-dominant discourse knows is that recovery does exist, 
that hopelessness is an active misconception in the dominant discourse, and hope , a form 
of discontinuity. What Copeland speaks about is awareness of having been marginalized, 
and of once participating in a dominant discourse that did not serve her, a discourse that 
did not include this possibility of hope of recovery.  This recovery discourse points to 
longitudinal studies, some global, revealing that many people fully recover from “major 
mental illness” with and without the use of psychiatric medications, and go on to live 
symptom-free lives (Davidson, Harding, Spaniol, 2005; DeSisto, Harding, Ashikaga, et 
al., 1995; Huber, Gross, Schuttler, 1975; Ogawa, Miya & Watarai, 1975).   
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Recovery is one of the main discontinuities that exists in the dominate discourse, 
that if accepted might present a different or transformative stance on psychiatric 
disability. One is left to question if the professional’s own hopelessness maintains a 
distance from this discourse of hope. For what scientists have found and discovered is the 
brain’s ability to regenerate cells in areas that are considered insufficient and 
recompensate in areas where regeneration is limited (Begley, 2007).  Science calls this 
neurogenesis and neuroplasticity, and it is an emerging part of the non-dominant 
discourse, being excluded in circles while simultaneously dislodging the complacent and 
careful Clinician’s Illusion, the Kraepelin methods, the Cartesian ideology that the brain 
is hard-wired, fixed, and doomed to be permanently biologically diseased in those who 
have been labeled with psychiatric diagnoses.  
Neuroplasticity is the brain's ability to rewire, or change neuronal networks. 
Neurogenesis is the creation of new brain cells, a process that occurs throughout the 
lifecycle.  The growing science of neuroplasticity demonstrates ways that the brain is 
malleable to internal and external stimuli, and can be transformed, changing in structure 
and network. In the late 70s and early 80s, Michael Merzenich began observing plasticity 
in the cortical mapping of the brain—others observed this previously, though most 
findings were challenged with the continuous claims that childhood brains, after a certain 
period, were immutable (Schwartz & Begley, 2002). Merzenich challenged this by 
demonstrating ways that the cortical maps become changeable when exposed to 
somatosensory experiences. Other researchers in the therapeutic fields began drawing 
connections between mental focus and decreased “psychiatric symptoms” that led toward 
the unraveling of biological permanence as an absolute truth claim.  
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Norman Doidge, a psychiatrist and researcher, brought this discussion of 
neuroplasticity forth to the greater public, along with others like Jeffrey Schwartz. 
Doidge (2007), in his book The Brain that Changes Itself, explains how thought can turn 
genes on and off, and rewire the brain as he illustrates story after story of personal 
accounts in which a woman with brain damage remapped her brain to be wholly 
functioning again, or how the power of thought changed one’s response to stress, or 
increased one’s IQ, or reversed a learning disability, etc. Schwartz, in his therapeutic 
discoveries that defied the biological permanence of obsessive compulsive disorder, 
describes how persons labeled are able to overcome their “symptoms” entirely by 
focusing the mind on a cognitive process that Schwartz calls “the four step method” 
(Schwartz & Begley, 2002). As the individual relabels, reattributes, refocuses, and 
revalues a given experience, the brain begins to re-map another process that replaces the 
supposed “pathological” former thought process. These researchers, by adjusting 
Cartesian assumptions, have re-inserted volition back into biology, reminding those in the 
mental health field of the resiliency of human beings, as Schwartz quotes one researcher: 
“willful redirection of attention is efficacious” (Schwartz & Begley, 2002, p. 297). In this 
way, a person’s situation becomes not so hopeless but hopeful. 
 Neuroplasticity and neurogenesis in the brain signify the brain’s power to heal 
itself. Beyond these scientific findings, research points to the power of focusing one’s 
attention in order to transform and induce neurogenesis in the brain, a dominant discourse 
in other cultures where meditation, for example, is a healing, transformative practice. 
Changes in the brain as a result of meditation and focused attention have been shown by 
fMRI studies (Lutz, Greischar, Rawlings, et al., 2004). 
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In the dominant discourse, where biological reductionism reigns, these reputable, 
scientific reports remain marginalized, publicly questioned and dismissed, for much is at 
stake if the brain can, in actuality, heal without medication. What would happen to the 
pharmaceutical industry, psychiatry, the insurance companies . . . and what would happen 
to the narrative between social worker and client in session? So often, what shifts a 
discursive ideology is the reconstruction of another, for the recovery discourse holds a 
truth that existed long before scientific evidence of neurogenesis and neuroplasticity:  
We have learned that we are in charge of our own lives and can go forward and 
do whatever it is we want to do. People who have experienced even the most 
severe psychiatric symptoms are doctors of all kinds, lawyers, teachers, 
accountants, advocates, social workers. We are successfully establishing and 
maintaining intimate relationships. We are good parents. We have warm 
relationships with our partners, parents, siblings, friends and colleagues. We are 
climbing mountains, planting gardens, painting pictures, writing books, making 
quilts, and creating positive change in the world. And it is only with this vision 
and belief for all people that we can bring hope for everyone (Mead and 
Copeland, 2000, p. 2). 
 
Yet, despite these exuberant reports of hopefulness, there are those who do not go 
on to remit symptoms, and there remains a dominant discourse that continues to focus on 
this as expansive of a greater psychiatric population. Many of these professionals, in the 
practice of trying to decrease “internalized stigma”, while carrying some awareness of the 
hopelessness that can become internalized in the individual, often harm when trying to 
help. In “Stigma and schizophrenia: Directions in student training,” Mason and Miller 
(2006) direct social workers on helping “clients recognize and cope with stigma so that 
the potentially negative effects can be lessened” (p. 73). In a group discussion about the 
etiology of schizophrenia, a social worker states: “Schizophrenia is about a chemical 
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imbalance causing people not to be their usual selves” (p. 84), discursively takes any 
power or volition out of the equation of possibilities for the person labeled..  
To be clear, no “chemical imbalance” has ever been measured in the brain 
(Lacasse & Leo, 2008; van Karmen & Kelly, 1991) and there is no identifiable brain 
“abnormality” associated with psychiatric disability that is conclusive, as studies below 
will attest. Despite the dominant discursive strategy of explaining certain psychiatric 
diagnoses as “chemical imbalances” or as “brain diseases” there is no founded evidence 
to support this discourse, only inferential reasoning, exaggeration and/or 
misinterpretation of scientific findings, as reported by Congress of the United States 
(1992):   
Research has yet to identify specific biological causes for any of these disorders. 
Mental disorders are classified on the basis of symptoms because there are as yet 
no biological markers or laboratory tests for them (p. 46).  
If higher concentrations of dopamine are associated with schizophrenia, then 
higher concentrations of these chemicals would be expected in persons with 
schizophrenia. The results are inconclusive (p. 78). 
It is useful to deconstruct this further: where does the saying “chemical 
imbalance” come from? The statement is derived from, once more, a reductionist 
reasoning that deduces the following: a person has schizophrenia, so he is given 
psychotropic medications to “treat” this “illness”. Because his symptoms decrease or go 
into full remission while on the medication, the medication which activates chemically 
altering properties, must have altered the brain chemically enough to “fix” the condition. 
If this is so, then one can infer that a chemical imbalance exists which can be treated with 
medication.  The Congress of the United States reiterates this hypothesis here:  
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In fact, many initial advances in understanding the biochemistry of mental 
disorders came from studies of drug actions in the brain. If a drug is found to be 
effective in treating a disorder, examination of that drug’s chemical action in the 
brain may lead to the discovery of an intrinsic pathology (1992, p.74). 
What science reveals is that no exact or "right" amount of chemical in the brain 
has been measured, determined or decided to be definitively normal. Logically, if there is 
no baseline for comparison, such claims rest on faulty premises. Studies reveal that levels 
of dopamine have been found to be no different in persons with or without a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia (Bentall, 2003). However, studies do reveal that a depletion of dopamine, 
for example, can decrease cell proliferation (Hoglinger, Rizk, & Muriel, 2004), which 
can be restored by dopamine agonist neuroleptic medications.  
To revisit reductionist claims regarding medication, the “dopamine hypothesis” 
(and likewise, the serotenergic hypothesis), at a deeper look, raises questions about the 
efficacy of standard antipsychotics, as follows: Psychotropic medications take 
approximately three weeks before showing any benefit or symptom remission in the 
person (a common fact of which the dominant discourse acknowledges along with the 
admission that this phenomenon is not understood). The hypothesis states further that 
upon the first dose administered, the person’s synapses are immediately flooded with the 
dopamine that is reportedly depleted in the brain, yet, despite this replenishment, 
psychiatric symptoms remain and continue sometimes for weeks, leaving scientists 
puzzled. 
There has been discovery of neuron-growth being stimulated by the psychotropic 
medications, explaining this to be the healing factor in medicine, not the flood of 
serotonin correcting a “chemical imbalance” (Lehrer, 2006). Studies have also revealed 
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the power of mind to stimulate new cell growth. The propensity for both medication and 
mental focus to stimulate neurogenesis presents an interesting competition for the power 
matrix, one in which the dominate discourse continuously demonstrates preference for 
medication over mind, or profit over the individual’s own resources.  
Other competing theories are brought forth by findings of neurogenesis. Schwartz, 
in reintroducing the will, also points to scientific notions of the “Heisenberg Uncertainty 
Principle”, another marginalized explanation for interpretations of a chemical imbalance. 
He explains that in the synapse (where neurotransmitters fire and seemingly produce 
“psychiatric symptoms”) 
…there is a probability associated with whether the calcium ions will trigger the 
release of neurotransmitters . . . a probability, that is, and not a certainty. There is, 
then, also a probability but not a certainty that this neuron will transmit the signal 
to the next one in the circuit without which the signal dies without leading to 
action” (Schwartz & Begley, 2002. p. 357). 
Schwartz, supported by other neuroscientists, explains this probability is due to thermal 
fluctuations as well as the ion channels’ “extremely narrow” tunnels that make the 
possibility of neurons firing to be a hit or miss situation. Then, Schwartz goes on to 
explain once more the power of the will in this probabilistic phenomenon, once more 
placing human decision into the scientific equation:  
Let’s take the example of a person suffering from OCD. In this case, one possible 
brain state corresponds to “Wash your hands again.” Another is, “Don’t wash—
go to the garden.” By expending mental effort—or, as I think of it, unleashing 
mental force—the person can focus attention on this second idea . . . As a result, 
the idea—whose physical embodiment is a physical brain state—“Go to the 
garden” is held in place longer than classical theory predicts. The triumphant idea 
can then make the body move, and through associated neuroplastic changes, alter 
the brain’s circuitry. This will change the brain in ways that will increase the 
probability of the “Go to the garden” brain state arising again.” 
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Social workers who have used Schwartz’ four step method in therapeutic settings with 
individuals experiencing OCD can attest to the power of this mind over matter process, as 
can the recovery discourse which provides a similarly parallel process described in 
chapter seven. Other studies reveal ways that individuals’ psychiatric experiences 
discontinue. As mentioned in a previous chapter, Ross (1989) acknowledges that many 
persons with a bipolar disorder diagnosis do not need mood stabilizers and can “get 
better” on their own, while others discontinue the medications after time, effectively 
(Ross, 1989).  
Although these findings have more scientific inquiry and testing to come, 
neurogenesis remains on the cutting edge, as well as on the fringe of the dominant 
discourse, where the possibility of impermanence threatens the economic gain of invested 
pharmaceutical systems in the mental health field—that is, unless cell proliferation can be 
treated with medication. Researchers are still studying where neurogenesis occurs and 
whether or not this can occur naturally, and scientists are finding ways to explain how 
neurogenesis can be manufactured by psychiatric medications.  
Despite ample support for adhering to medication protocols, studies show persons 
labeled with schizophrenia may do better with little or no psychiatric medication 
(Harrow, 2007; Whitaker, 2004; Bola and Mosher, 2002). It is not uncommon for social 
workers to be unaware of this information. For example, in the aforementioned study of 
social workers seeking to decrease internalized “stigma” in persons with diagnoses, the 
authors coach social workers from the dominant medical model about how  “stigma . . . is 
almost always a factor when compliance with medication is poor” (Mason and Miller, 
2006, p. 87). One interesting aspect of this statement is that the authors locate “stigma” as 
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something the person labeled creates. This is a confusion of the term, where many 
professionals seem to interpret “stigma” as a product of the person instead of the societal 
acts of stereotyping, discrimination, and fear that is projected onto the person, having less 
to do with the individual’s behavior and more to do with the negative attitudes and beliefs 
associated with the label.  Also, the social workers explain that medication non-
compliance may result in more symptoms which increase a person's experience of 
"stigma". In this way, Mason and Miller coach social workers on the importance of 
“medication compliance”, while not giving any indication of the client’s feelings or 
experience regarding medication compliance. 
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CHAPTER VI 
SYSTEMIC OPPRESSION IN THE MENTAL HEALTH FIELD 
 
In preparing my talk I reflected on what the most important message was I could 
share with these young people who would soon enter professional practice. The 
message I felt called to share was rather simple: People with disabilities are 
people. When we forget that people with disabilities share a common humanity 
with us then the human is stripped from the human services and the stage is set for 
the emergence of the inhuman and the inhumane. The inhuman and the inhumane 
emerge from that rupture which occurs when one human being fails to recognize 
and reverence the humanity and the fundamental sanctity, sovereignty and dignity 
of another person. Such a rupture in mutual relatedness occurs often in the helping 
professions and for this reason helping professionals sometimes hurt rather than 
help people with disabilities. Too often the human services dehumanize and 
depersonalize. Many people with disabilities refer to this special kind of hurt as 
“spirit breaking” or “how the system tries to break your spirit (Deegan, 1990). 
This chapter will review findings that show individuals who have been labeled become 
socially devalued, stereotyped, discriminated against in and outside of the mental health 
field. As Link states, the power relationship includes “. . . elements of labeling, 
stereotyping, separation, status loss, and discrimination [that] occur together in a power 
situation that allows them’’ (Link & Phelan, 2001, p. 377).   
Prevalence of Negative Attitudes and Beliefs about Psychiatric Labels 
Numerous studies support the prevalence of social separation between those with 
and those without labels. The longstanding debate for and against labeling theory was a 
discussion of whether or not social rejection of those with labels was a result of the 
“stigmatizing” label itself or the “bizarre” or “abnormal” behavior displayed by those 
with labels (Scheff, 1966; Gove, 1970).  Since, efforts to identify and address attitudes 
and beliefs about mental health problems have been in progress for the past 50 years 
 68 
(Nunnally, 1961). Goffman (1963) described the label one is given upon entering the 
mental health field as being “an attribute that is deeply discrediting”. This was coined as 
“stigma”.  Weinstein challenged labeling theory in 1983, arguing the proponents and 
opponents of the theory had failed to explore how those diagnosed perceived their labels.  
This sparked some directives set out to determine the existing attitudes and beliefs and 
how, if at all, they were internalized by the person.  It was in these movements some 
attention was given to the discursive power of diagnostic labeling. 
Negative Attitudes and Beliefs of the General Public 
In a multi-field meta-analysis study of negative attitudes and beliefs about 
individuals with psychiatric labels and researchers found that “stigma” was “strong 
enough to be observed in everyday life” (Mak, Poon, Pun and Cheung, 2007). Despite 
assumptions that the Olmstead Act (1999) would improve attitudes and beliefs following 
deinstitutionalization, studies show that those with labels in alternative settings are also 
looked down upon (Liggins & Hatcher, 2005).  In two identical UK public opinion 
surveys, little change was recorded over 10 years, with over 80% endorsing the statement 
that “most people are embarrassed by mentally ill people”, and about 30% agreeing “I am 
embarrassed by mentally ill persons” (Huxley, 1993).   
Accompanying these general negative attitudes and beliefs is often a lack of 
knowledge about psychiatric disabilities. Though the general public can distinguish 
between diagnoses, overall knowledge about psychiatric disability is low (Lauber et al., 
2003) and poorly understood (Byrne, 2000). Wolff, Pathare, Craig, and Leff (1996) found 
that lack of knowledge about mental health is associated with negative attitudes and that 
attitudes can be improved through psychoeducation.  
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Negative attitudes and beliefs can exist on many levels within the public and 
among professionals. Socio-demographic factors can determine attitudes (Wolff et al., 
1996) and these perceptions can vary in degree, depending on the specific diagnosis and 
socio-cultural group (Lau & Cheung, 1999; Lee, Lee, Chiu, & Kleinman, 2005). Agency 
and organizational factors in mental health settings may only have a slight contribution to 
the variation of “stigmatization” (Verhaeghe & Bracke, 2007). Negative attitudes have 
been observed in undergraduate students (Corrigan, 2001), in media depictions (Philo, 
1996), and even among family members. Families may distance themselves from 
members who have been labeled, due to negative attitudes and beliefs of the public or 
even fear of how they may be treated by others outside of the family (Rudge & Morse, 
2004).  For these reasons, Miller and Mason (2002) found that many clients choose not to 
tell friends or less immediate family members. 
Negative Attitudes and Beliefs of Professionals 
Studies show that mental health professionals also harbor negative attitudes and 
beliefs about individuals with diagnoses. Negative values can be part of the therapeutic 
countertransference from social worker to client (Trull, 2006).  Wahl (1999) found 28 out 
of 100 of people he interviewed who had been labeled reported mental health caregivers 
as giving “discouraging advice”, along with “disparaging remarks and rejecting 
behavior”. One respondent, for instance, reported mistreatment by mental health care 
professionals: "I have worked at [a psychiatric facility]. As with many other facilities in 
which I have worked, the patients are spoken about with disrespect, sometimes mocked, 
and often spoken to in shaming ways" (p. 473). Another respondent, while a medical 
student in training, stated: "The treatment of psych patients in all rotations was awful. 
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They would laugh at them, poke fun at them on rounds, disbelieve any physical 
complaint they had" (p. 473). In a study on the use of language recorded in nurse 
documentation on inpatient units, only 1% out of over 4000 entries demonstrated a 
positive regard toward the patient, whereas 20% of the language was rated as ‘pejorative, 
punitive, inane and nonsense’ (Mohr, 1999, p. 1056). Examples included “is controlling 
and engages in power plays with staff” “mostly superficial and manipulative – focuses on 
[herself] exclusively”, etc.  
Though psychiatrists may hold more favorable attitudes than the general public 
(Kingdon, 2004), there is a tendency for medical personnel and psychiatrists to be 
unaware of stigmatizing attitudes and beliefs they carry that directly affect the client 
(Sartorius, 2002). Studies suggest psychiatrists perpetuate many concepts underlying 
biased and “stigmatizing” attitudes, and suggest that the way in which psychiatry is 
structured maintains the status quo (Fink & Tasman, 1992).  
“Stigma” may be more devastating, life-limiting and long lasting than the primary 
illness (Schulze et al., 2003). Wahl (1999) surveyed 1301 ‘consumers’ (all NAMI 
participants) and interviewed 100 of these to look at personal experience as well as 
attitudes and beliefs. He found that 80% of respondents overheard hurtful or offensive 
comments about people with ‘mental illness’; 77% encountered offensive media 
portrayals; 27% were advised to lower their expectations in life; 7 of 10 were treated as 
less competent once they disclosed their disability; 95 of 100 perceived long-term 
consequences due to negative attitudes and beliefs about their diagnosis.  One study 
found that 70% of caregivers of those with diagnoses believe the label is devaluing to the 
person (Struening, Perlick & Link, 2001). Negative attitudes and beliefs about mental 
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illness have been shown to contribute to employment and income in a harmful way (Link, 
1982), poverty and lack of access to socially valued roles (Wolfensberger, 2000), 
discrimination (Dinos, Stevens & Serfaty, 2005; Phillips, Pearson, Feifei, Minjie & Yang, 
2002), and marginalization (Police, McCormick & Dewees, 1995) 
Stereotyping Individuals with Psychiatric Labels 
Stereotypes are described as exaggerated differences between groups that are 
emphasized through categorizations that create an us/them divide (Townsend, 1979). 
Stereotypes include perceiving those with psychiatric labels in distancing ways that 
include thoughts about the other as being different. Persons with labels have been 
perceived as being unpredictable, dangerous, and blameworthy (Jones et. al., 1984); 
dangerousness (Nunnelly, 1961; Phelan, 1997). There are beliefs that persons labeled 
with schizophrenia and bipolar disorder are predisposed for violence (Link 1998). In a 
recent survey, Crisp, Gelder & Rix (2000) found those with a range of seven psychiatric 
disabilities were perceived by the general population as hard to talk to, different and 
unpredictable; 70% of respondents thought that people with schizophrenia, alcoholism 
and drug addiction were dangerous, and those with substance abuse problems were to 
blame for their problem. According to one study, employers’ main concerns about those 
with labels include perceptions of dangerousness, reduced productivity, presence of 
strange behaviors, and risk of relapse (Tsang, Angell, Corrigan, Yueh-Ting Lee, Kan Shi 
& Lam, 2007). 
Stereotypes can be heterogeneous attributions toward all persons with a label, or 
they can be particular to a diagnosis. For example, schizophrenia (Sartorius, 2002) and 
personality disorders are more negatively viewed (Lancee, & Garfinkle, 1989; Lewis & 
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Appleby, 1988). Markham (2003) found that Registered Mental Health Nurses (RMNs) 
expressed less social rejection towards patients with a diagnosis of schizophrenia and 
perceived them to be less dangerous than patients with a BPD label. Health Care 
Assistants (HCAs) made no such distinctions on these measures. Staff were least 
optimistic about patients with a BPD diagnosis and were more negative about their 
experience of working with this group compared to the other patient groups; Clinicians 
and researchers have also emphasized that staff often experience extreme emotional 
responses to such patients and draw attention to the potential disruption and harm that 
may ensue to both staff and patients (Beck et al., 1990; Main, 1957). Supportive of these 
findings, Lewis and Appleby (1988) found in surveying psychiatrists on their responses 
to vignettes that described particular diagnoses, responded with value judgments, such as 
“unlikely to improve”, “likely to annoy”, “manipulative”, etc. 
Discrimination of Persons Given Psychiatric Labels 
The APA (1992) reports:  
For decades, persons with disabilities have been identified by their disability first, 
and as persons, second. Often, persons with disabilities are viewed as being 
afflicted with, or being victims of, a disability. In focusing on the disability, an 
individual's strengths, abilities, skills, and resources are often ignored. In many 
instances, persons with disabilities are viewed neither as having the capacity or 
right to express their goals and preferences nor as being resourceful and 
contributing members of society. Many words and phrases commonly used when 
discussing persons with disabilities reflect these biases (p 1). 
Discrimination of those with psychiatric labels occurs in every aspect of social and 
economic existence (Dinos et al., 2005; Fink & Tasman, 1992; Read & Reynolds, 1997; 
Byrne, 1997; Thompson & Thompson, 1997), is considered a universal problem (Kabir, 
Iliyasu, Abubakar, & Aliyu, 2004; Tsang et al., 2007), as well as one that is local to 
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communities, families, churches, coworkers, and mental health care givers (Wahl, 1999). 
Though social support contributes to self esteem (Mechanic, McAlpine, Rosenfield, & 
Davis, 1994) and socially valued roles are considered to be a healing factor for those with 
diagnoses, studies reveal that those with diagnoses are often denied access to social roles 
(Wolfensberger, 2000) and as a consequence can experience social isolation (Aubry, Teft 
& Currie, 1995). One way persons with psychiatric labels are discriminated against is in 
the pursuit of higher education. One individual states: "Frequently psychologists and 
doctors [seem to believe that] all schizophrenics .... aren't capable and cannot achieve a 
higher education” (Wahl, 1999, p. 79). College administrators and staff often lack 
understanding of psychiatric disability and how this affects students’ treatment regarding 
psychiatric experiences (Frankie et al., 1996).   
Also common in mental health settings is a tendency for those labeled to be 
dissuaded from seeking employment. One mental health professional states: 
The second civil violation that may occur is the stigmatizing of the patient due to 
their diagnostic label. How many retail shops will want to hire a schizophrenic? If 
one sees the label "schizophrenic," it hardly seems to matter that the individual is 
on medication and stable, and has been so for nearly a year. Instead, the public 
tends to think only of the label and serious civil rights violations may arise (Trull, 
2005, p. 135). 
Cnaan (1988) states that work is an essential part of being in the community. To 
add, employment is one of the characteristics of “rehabilitation” for those who have been 
labeled with a psychiatric disability (Anthony, Cohen, Farkas, 1990). Though the label 
may account for some unemployment situations, lack of access seems to be a larger issue. 
According to Powell (2002), 70% of “consumers” want to work while less than 15% are 
working and less than five per cent have access to supported employment.  Mental health 
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professionals contribute to employment discrimination; According to Wahl (1999), more 
than 25% of 100 persons interviewed reported being advised by case managers to lower 
their job expectations well below their educational, training, and intellectual levels 
(Wahl, 1999); As one person interviewed by Wahl (1999) describes: "I've had case 
managers hint not to push for the highest accomplishment I can do. Sometimes it would 
be nice if they would push for something more than just sitting in chairs all day (p. 9)." 
Still another interviewee described how the doctor who first diagnosed her bipolar 
disorder told her that "people with your problem will have a very low level type of life (p. 
9)” (Wahl, 1999). Additional studies reveal those who have a psychiatric disability 
experience continued problems finding employment and housing (Pickenhagen & 
Sartorius, 2002). 
To follow, having a psychiatric label is related to lower socioeconomic status, 
homelessness and imprisonment, and systematic exclusion (Kelly, 2006). Those with 
psychiatric labels are systemically denied access to equal healthcare. Studies reveal that 
those with psychiatric diagnoses experience poorer quality of care for physical illnesses 
(Pickenhagen & Sartorius, 2002), leading to discrimination of services for treating 
physical illness and lower standards in diagnostic procedures (Fang & Rizzo, 2007). To 
extend this dilemma, mental health services remain poorly funded (Carlisle, 2003). Kelly 
(2006) found these exclusions to be a lack of emphasis on mental health issues on both 
social and political level agendas, exclusion of individuals with diagnoses from civic and 
social life, and ongoing failure to address the deficiencies of health and social services 
provided for those with diagnoses, and considered these to be an act of structural 
violence. Perhaps one of the more interesting social exclusions is revealed by the law 
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itself. Szasz (1990) states, “Today, Americans live under two sets of laws: one applicable 
to the sane, the other to the insane.” Those with psychiatric disabilities, though this is 
changing, have historically had very little part in policy level decisions, as one person 
states: 
We are excluded systematically, we don’t have the rich lobbyists, we don’t have 
the pipeline to Washington. The policy wonks are the ones that are making all 
these decisions about us and for us, and we need to find a way to get our people 
represented in a genuine, participatory fashion, in housing decisions, Social 
Security decisions, and HCFA health care decisions. (NCD, 2000) 
Systemic Abuse of Persons with Psychiatric Labels 
Studies reveal ways that antipsychotic medications, while creating “symptom 
remission” for some, have also harmed—a fact that is underestimated among 
professionals, hidden in public discourse, and in some instances lied about by 
pharmaceutical companies profiting off the medication at the expense of others’ lives.  
There are reports that reveal the government supports cheaper medications even if these 
have devastating effects compared to more expensive options (Sartorius, 2002). There are 
reports that psychiatrists do not listen to persons who report harmful side effects of their 
medication. When the person who is taking the medication is not involved in the 
psychiatric process, the result can be power abuse.  
Prescribed antipsychotics for children increased fivefold between 1995 and 2002 
in the United States (Cooper, Arbogast, Ding et al., 2006). Although second generation 
antipsychotics do not produce some of the older side effects of Extra Pyramidal 
Symptoms (e.g. tardive dyskenisia) come with their own set of detriments, including 
potential weight gain, and hyperglycemia, and hypertension (Correll, Pnezner, and 
Parikh, 2006) in addition to negatively affecting the cardiovascular, neurological, 
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endocrine and hematological systems (Bryden, Carrey, and Kutcher, 2001). Examples of 
these affected systems include hyperprolactinemia and sedation (Pappagallo and Silva, 
2004). Risk of treatment-emergent diabetes in individuals under 24 years of age is four 
times greater than that of the general population (Harrison-Woolrych, Garcia-Quiroga, 
Ashton et al., 2007). The span of iatrogenic harms can include anything from death to 
common side effects such as sexual dysfunction, inability to concentrate, 
depersonalization, etc.   
As it stands today, mental health parity is only granted to those who are 
considered to have “biologically based” diagnoses; in other words, only diagnoses that 
are supported by the dominant discursive practice of biological determinism. Those who 
have psychiatric experiences that are not biologically claimed are, therefore, excluded. 
The one exception being that of involuntary hospitalization, an act many consider to be a 
human rights violation in itself. Hospitals have had to undergo legislative changes so that 
the rights of “patients” in institutions include basic allowances, such as making a phone 
call or receiving visitors. Voting privileges are rarely requested for those in inpatient 
settings. There remains a longstanding history of harm and abuse that has occurred within 
the system, a history that is well beyond the scope of this paper. Deegan illustrates her 
experience:  
But there are some sounds you can never get used to. Like the sound of a man 
strapped down in restraint and crying out “Help. Help me. Someone please help 
me.” . . . When I first heard him crying out, I jumped out of bed and ran down the 
hallway. What I found amazed me. There, outside the door of the seclusion room, 
was a mental health worker sitting with his legs swung casually over the side of a 
soft lounge chair. He had parked the lounge chair outside of the open door from 
which the cry was emanating. The mental health worker was flipping through a 
magazine. He appeared to not hear the cry of the man in the seclusion room. 
Actually, it was as if he didn’t even recognize that the patient in that room was a 
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person who was in great distress. . . Quietly, I slipped past the mental health 
worker and looked inside the seclusion room. An old man, probably about sixty or 
so, with white hair and very thin, was strapped down on a green rubber mattress. 
Heavy leather cuffs lashed his wrists and ankles to the cold steel of a metal bed 
frame. He was stripped naked except for his underwear. . . When I saw that 
mental health worker sitting in a casual comfort outside of the room in which a 
man was restrained, humiliated and crying out for help, I froze in terror and 
disbelief. For a moment I could not move. I felt numb. Then I felt a tearing inside 
my heart. . . You see, if you are a patient in a mental hospital and you hear a 
fellow patient who is in restraint and who is crying out for help, you are not 
allowed to answer the cry. You are not allowed to be fully human, to be whole 
and therefore able to respond to another human being compassionately. You are 
not allowed to go into that room next to the old man and talk softly to him. You 
are not allowed to bring him drink of water or to wipe his brow or to just sit there 
with him so that he will not feel so abandoned (Deegan, 1990, p. 304). 
Internalized Oppression 
DeNiro (1995) describes three forms of social disconnection that people with 
labels experience: loneliness, isolation and lack of solidarity (“not fitting in” or “being 
different Individuals who have been labeled internalize discriminatory behaviors and 
negative attitudes and beliefs, anticipate distancing or rejection, and develop coping 
strategies (secrecy about diagnosis or withdrawal from social interactions) to avoid 
rejection.  This often leads to self-deprecation and hopelessness about having mastery 
over one’s life (Wright, Gronfein & Owens, 2000). As previously mentioned, individuals 
who have been labeled may cling to the group they identify with (those with same 
diagnoses or heterogeneous groups of those diagnosed) for protection (Goffman, 1963). 
Comparison to others with diagnoses seen as “worse off” (Pickens, 1999) sets up a 
hierarchy of oppression internal to the oppressed group as a whole. Individuals labeled 
with psychiatric disabilities may experience barriers to community integration (Prince & 
Prince, 2002), sensitivity to social disapproval (Boydell et al., 2002), feelings of isolation, 
fears of not being understood by friends and families, and expectations of being rejected 
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by community members (Prince & Prince, 2002; Williams & Collins, 1999). Obstacles to 
social integration: fear of rejection, ambiguity about what to disclose, poverty, and low 
motivation or energy levels (Boydell et al., 2002; DeNiro, 1995) all contribute to group 
identity devaluation, and thus personal devaluation.  
Concealing Labels 
Individuals who are able to detach themselves, maintain some privacy and protect 
themselves from accepting negative characterization by others are able to fare better in 
the community (Boydell et al., 2002). Hence there is a tendency to not disclose as Kay 
Redfield Jamison describes: 
The problem with mental illness is that so many who have it—especially those in 
a position to change public attitudes, such as doctors, lawyers, politicians, and 
military officers—are reluctant to risk talking about mental illness, or seeking 
help for it. They are understandably frightened about professional and personal 
reprisals.  
Studies suggest those who are receiving treatment for psychiatric disability may 
demonstrate poor performance, feel less appreciated, and more anxious interacting with 
others if their label is not concealed (Farina et al., 1971). It is not uncommon for those 
with labels to conceal information (Sayce, 2000).  
Treatment Avoidance 
Perhaps it is no surprise there are negative views associated with the mental 
health system (DeNiro, 1995), as acceptance of psychiatric care signifies the client’s 
acceptance of  a label (Pearlin, 1999) which, as described above, carries a plethora of 
negative attitudes and beliefs, some of which may already exist in the person before a 
label has even been given. Studies reveal a direct relationship between treatment 
adherence and negative attitudes and beliefs (Sirey, Bruce, Alexopoulos, Perlick, 
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Friedman & Meyer, 2001), as well as reports that negative attitudes inhibit service use 
(Leaf & Bruce, 1987). Less than 40% of individuals with initial onset of psychiatric 
symptoms seek professional help within a year (Andrews et al., 2001). Individuals with 
diagnoses of schizophrenia are found to be particularly sensitive to social rejection 
(Boydell et al., 2002), which may add to treatment avoidance. 
Hopelessness has perhaps been the impetus for a new discourse outside the 
dominant frame.  Deegan explains passionately how a discourse of recovery begins out of 
this hopelessness in the dominant discourse. She emphasizes the experiences of 
hopelessness:  
We were going to make it. We were never going to come back to the hospital 
again. . . Some did make it. But most of us returned home and found that nothing 
was the same anymore. Our friends were frightened of us or were strangely 
absent. They were overly careful when near us. Our families were distraught and 
torn by guilt. They had not slept and their eyes were still swollen from the tears 
they cried. And we, we were exhausted. But we were willing to try. And I swear, 
with all the courage we could muster we tried to return to work and to school, we 
tried to pick up the pieces, and we prayed for the strength and perseverance to 
keep trying. . . our winter deepened into a bone chilling cold. Something began to 
die in us. Something way down deep began to break. Slowly the messages of 
hopelessness and stigma which so permeated the places we received treatment, 
began to sink in. It seemed that the system tried to break our spirit and was more 
intent on gaining, even coercing our compliance, than listening to our needs. . . 
We found ourselves undergoing that dehumanizing transformation from being a 
person to being an illness: “a schizophrenic”, “a multiple”, “a bi-polar” . . .we 
were coached by professionals to learn to say [it] . . . And each time we repeated 
this dehumanizing litany our sense of being a person was diminished as “the 
disease” loomed as an all powerful “It”, a wholly other entity, an “in-itself” that 
we were taught we were powerless over (Deegan, 1996, p. 5). 
To many, the mental health field is rooted in pessimism, and maintains a posture of 
pessimism. As other voices of recovery echo Deegan’s sentiments: "People have gotten 
used to their identities and roles as ill, victims, fragile, dependent and even as unhappy. 
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Long ago we learned to “accept” our illnesses, give over our control to others and tolerate 
the way of life" (Mead and Copeland, 2000).  
Although the dominate discourse maintains a position of managing illness over 
the whole person (Mueser, Rosenberg, Goodman & Trumbetta, 2002), and often steers 
away from alternative approaches and theories of care (Merry, 1995), persons with 
disabilities are creating their own paths for healing, and some are asking health care 
providers to hear them and join them. Many suggest there is a need for radical change in 
theory, mindset, and foundation (see Read and Reynolds, 1996) of how psychiatric 
disability is interpreted and understood. Bentall suggests that the main problem in mental 
health services is one of ‘ideas’. He states: 
I will suggest that we have been laboring under serious misunderstandings about 
the nature of madness for more than a century, and that many contemporary 
approaches to the problem, although cloaked with the appearance of scientific 
rigor, have more in common with astrology than rational science. Only by 
abolishing these misunderstandings can we hope to improve the lot of the most 
impoverished, neglected and vulnerable of our citizens (2003, p. 8).  
Radical change in ways of knowing and treating psychiatric disability is perhaps what a 
recovery discourse embodies, as it is unfortunately in this time of mental health, that the 
voices of those directly affected by our system have not systematically been included. 
“Radical” becomes first the act of including those voices.  
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CHAPTER VII 
SHIFTING THE FRAME: TOWARD A CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE MENTAL 
HEALTH FIELD 
 
A recovery discourse offers suggestions for change directly from those who have 
been labeled by the mental health system. In this way, turning toward a recovery 
discourse, if only to better understand what is happening in the field of mental health, 
becomes of value to the social worker.  The social worker then considers the option of 
making change from a more informed and inclusive position, emphasizing a 
consciousness of that position as it grounds the social worker to make intentional 
decisions about the discourse and the practice. In contemplating change for the mental 
health professionals, Deegan distinguishes the difference between superficial change and 
conscious change, while focusing on one of the core values of the recovery discourse, as 
demonstrated in the following passage: 
I worry we will content ourselves with superficial change . . . in the fifties it was 
the doctors and the patients. In the sixties it was the staff and the clients. In the 
seventies it was the providers and the consumers . . .Yes, the names we call each 
other have certainly changed. . . But I would argue that the fundamental 
relationship between those labeled with mental illness and those who are not, has 
remained essentially unchanged. . . You see, I would argue that . . . until the 
radical power imbalance between us is at least equalized, until our relationships 
are marked by true mutuality . . . until we recognize the common ground of our 
shared humanity and stop the spirit breaking effects of dehumanizing in the 
mental health system, then the gaping hole will continue to sink the best of our 
efforts. . . mental health programs and the community must change if people are 
going to move from just surviving to the journey of recovery (Deegan, 1996, p. 
11). 
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This investigation of mental health discourse will conclude by creating space for a 
curiosity about a recovery discourse, a discourse that points to a need for the mental 
health field to undergo a fundamental change of cultivating a deeper understanding of the 
power dynamics inherent in the dominant discourse, while creating space for a recovery 
over illness model. This fundamental change becomes a directive shift, not the washing 
over of an epiphany that presupposes immediate change. Foucault once said, “One cannot 
speak of anything at any time; it is not enough for us to open our eyes, to pay attention, or 
to be aware, for new objects suddenly to light up and emerge out of the ground” 
(Foucault, 1972, p.44). What Foucault means is that having sight and awareness of the 
language, and what it represents in the mental health field is not enough, that a new 
language and a consciousness of inclusion do not just emerge—it must be cultivated 
through a deeper understanding. One way of beginning this process is by contemplating 
this message of recovery discourse. 
 One way to begin this process is by listening without defense and judgment to 
those who feel they have been harmed, avoiding the traps of discrediting the voice, or 
determining the discourse as not worthy. Another way is by seeking to find and 
understand what voice, what experience has become marginalized. This comes with 
recognizing, as social workers, the long history of these patterns of speaking out against 
the dominant mental health discourse and being dismissed. Then one may choose to act. 
Action requires consciousness, not just of the language, but as postmodern thought 
suggests, a willingness to look underneath the language, at the history, at all of the forces 
of power that have produced this language. For this has been the work of this thesis, to go 
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back and look at some of the historical facts and figures that have created and maintained 
a discourse of power. 
Contemplating Hope 
A recovery discourse poses statements about hope, which can be contemplated: 
No one is beyond hope. Everyone has the ability to make choices. Even though 
health care professionals have traditionally been asked to define treatment and 
prognosis, they have to look through the layers of learned helplessness, years of 
institutionalization, difficult behaviors, then they can creatively begin to help a 
person reconstruct a life narrative that is defined by hope, challenge, 
accountability, mutual relationship and an ever changing self concept (Mead & 
Copeland, 2000, p. 1). 
One can contemplate the above passage in many ways, or one can simply agree with it. 
Agreeing with it may be a way of idealizing the text, of idealizing the role of the social 
worker by assuming that the field of social work does maintain such levels of hope, 
perhaps because proclamations are made by professors or by the agency that suggest this 
place of hope. In this way, the social worker can create a discursive distancing between 
the stated place of social work versus the actuality of what others’ voiced experience of 
the field might be—that in fact, some do experience a theme of hopelessness. Deegan 
encourages mental health workers to “understand that we are faced with recovering not 
just from mental illness, but also from the effects of being mentally ill” (1993, p. 10). 
In contemplating this more deeply, one can ask how the social worker genuinely 
engages with such notions as “hope”—are these notions limited to certain clients? Is hope 
a mutually shared phenomenon in the therapeutic relationship? How does the idea of 
mutual relationship work in the social work profession? Does the social worker have a 
deep grasp on what mutual relationship means, or is the social worker perhaps turned off 
by this notion of “mutual relationship” in a way that obscures the underlying meaning of 
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what mutual relationship actually infers? Does the social worker become curious about 
this “mutual relationship” – enough to allow a cognitive dissonance to occur? Perhaps 
enough for the social worker to contemplate the more hidden aspects of power in the 
therapeutic relationship? How would the therapeutic relationship look if social workers 
were able to allow space for “mutual relationship” and “hope” while still upholding the 
values of the social work field? Or how has history shaped the group identity of those 
with psychiatric disability, and how can the field of social work respond to this collective 
trauma in a therapeutic way? Does the social work field contribute to “learned 
helplessness”? One can contemplate these things in a myriad of ways.  
The remainder of this chapter is written in the interest of contemplating what 
shifts may occur when including this practice of hope, an ever-emerging, fluid concept in 
the discourse of recovery.  This chapter is not for those for whom this thesis has been a 
hollow discussion of mechanical thoughts about language. As Nietzsche states, “Our 
supreme insights must – and should! sound like follies and sometimes like crimes when 
they are heard without permission by those who are not predisposed and predestined for 
them” (1966, p.61). This chapter responds to the criticism of social work having placed 
too much emphasis on the DSM in psychosocial pedagogy instead of focusing on theories 
of strength and sociological influences (Lacasse and Gomory, 2003), and of social work 
students who feel their education does not focus enough on practice issues regarding 
those with “severe mental illness” (Miller & Mason, 2002; Mowbray, 2002).  It is a 
response of remembering that the mental health system cannot provide all of the clients’ 
needs, but that a community that embraces difference, instead of pathologizing that 
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difference, and distancing that difference, can. Deegan explains this focus of hope and 
hopelessness to be at the core of a recovery discourse: 
I try to help students understand that although they do not have the power to 
change or motivate the person with a psychiatric disability who is hard of heart, 
they do have the power to change the environment, including the human 
interactive environment, in which that person is surviving. When working with a 
person with a psychiatric disability who is hard of heart, who has given up and 
who is motivated not to care anymore, we must understand that this is a person 
who feels they have no power. They experience all the power to be in the hands of 
others. They experience what psychologists call an external loss of control. For 
such people it is imperative to create an environment in which there are choices to 
be made. I am speaking here not of forced choice such as either take your 
medications or you go back to the hospital . . . but of real choices (Deegan, 2001, 
p. 10). 
Studies support this notion of hope in mental health workers as being the main ingredient 
for many of those who emerge from their psychiatric struggles in a mental health setting 
(Chinmen et al., 1999). As this notion of hope in a recovery discourse is further 
suspended, the following passages will briefly discuss a few discursive strategies for 
change, followed by a closing reflection on the recovery discourse as it relates to the field 
of social work. 
Discursive Strategies for Making Change 
In this thesis, many discursive strategies have demonstrated (without drawing 
attention to them as demonstrations) how change occurs in discourse. Positive Discourse 
Analysis (PDA) points to some strategies that may create shifts in the dominant 
discourse, challenging the underlying belief systems and domination within the 
knowledge field. Discursive strategies are common practices used every day, though 
awareness of them can become an adaptive skill of change-making that can be utilized. 
Some of the discursive strategies implemented in this thesis include complexification, 
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inversion, a bit of parody, and reframing. All strategies are outlined by Macgilchrist 
(2007) in “Positive Discourse Analysis: Contesting discourses by reframing the issues”, 
as she emphasizes the fluidity of power and the ever-emerging opportunity for shifts to 
occur in which the otherwise marginal discourses can become more central. Though 
Magilchrist implements these strategies as a way for news journalists to shift a 
perspective, these strategies can also be used in other discursive practices, such as the 
mental health field, as will be demonstrated in the following paragraphs. 
In chapter four, “complexification” was used to explain that the history and the 
power dynamics in the mental health field are not a simple mode of hierarchy where 
psychiatry reigns. Being inclusive of multiple meanings of power and the angles from 
which they are derived “complexifies” an issue so that it can be understood more deeply, 
while removing the defensive stance of oversimplifying the issue.  Complexification 
allows for ownership of one’s own role in power dynamics, for what is emphasized is that 
there is not one party (such as the body of psychiatry) to blame; rather, power is a 
multidirectional force that is fed by dominant and non-dominant parties. It is by 
excavating part of the history that has been omitted that allows for a deeper 
understanding of how social injustice is supported by unassuming parties. This allows the 
social worker to consider ways in which the field of social work also has a role in the 
oppression that occurs in the mental health field. Complexification can be used by the 
social worker to gently create a more dispersed share of taking responsibility for the 
power dynamics that exist. 
Another strategy, “inversion”, is exactly what it sounds like.  In responding to the 
dominant view where a truth claim is made, the discursive strategy is to invert the 
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information by arguing that “no, in fact it is not” true (Macgilchrist, 2007). This is 
precisely the strategy used in chapter five, as a counter truth was presented after each 
dominant claim of what psychiatric disability means.  Inversion can be useful, especially 
to those social workers engaged in understanding what science in fact supports, and what 
people claim it supports. These social workers hold understanding of the knowledge field 
and how it is abused. They have counter evidence to offer in a classroom where 
inaccurate information is being taught, or counter evidence to offer to a client who feels 
he is doomed with no hope for recovery.  Social workers can reveal that, in fact, people 
recover all the time, and offer examples of how. 
“Parody” is a strategy that is more complex, the point being to bring the shared 
knowledge of a dominant discourse to the fore as a way of engaging the person or 
audience, and then to follow that shared knowledge by interrogating its validity. This is 
done often by those who attempt to discuss the problems of the dominant frame. Often, 
social workers seeking to share or integrate a new discourse find there is no language to 
use that can be heard or understood by those who have not been exposed to the 
alternative discourse. Finding a way in becomes difficult. Using parody, the speaker  
engages the dominant discourse using language familiar to the discourse, as a way to turn 
the conversation in the direction of considering that discourse as not being the whole 
truth.  For example, choosing the language to use in this thesis was a difficult process. 
Though calling those with labels “mentally ill persons” feels pejorative in light of what I 
know about the harm such language has caused, I wondered if more readers would be 
more attuned to the message of the thesis if I did in fact use the language that dominates 
the mental health field. Parody, then, is often accompanied with inversion, as the reader is 
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drawn into a language that is familiar, the writer then can create space for questioning 
that language.  
In this way, reframing was a strategy used in this thesis. As Macgilchrist (2007) 
states, “reframing can be defined as shifting an issue away from its conventional 
‘location’ within one set of shared assumptions and construing it within a different set of 
knowledges”. Reframing can include techniques of inversion, and can be incorporated in 
partial or more radical contexts.  Often, social workers who attempt to reframe issues 
within their agency will use “partial reframing” where the discourse is challenged with 
counter information offered by the social worker. The reframe is considered “partial” 
because the social worker may not use direct inversion, or point blame in any direction. 
“Radical reframing” takes this a step further, and explains how the dominant discourse 
uses language to perpetuate information that is not true, based on the counter information 
provided by the other discourse. By referring to the strategies used in this thesis, social 
workers can reflect on how a process of change may begin in the dominant discourse. 
Contemplating a Recovery Discourse 
Recovery discourse encourages a therapeutic environment that takes the whole 
person into account, not just the person’s diagnosis and treatment agenda.  Inclusive is 
the individual’s collective identity and how this identity has served to create narrative 
themes of hopelessness in the individual. Creating narratives of hope is at the heart of the 
recovery discourse. The question becomes: What can the social worker do to help 
cultivate hope? Deegan, speaking from the recovery discourse, reminds the mental health 
professional: 
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It is not our job to pass judgment on who will and will not recover from mental 
illness and the spirit breaking effects of poverty, stigma, dehumanization, 
degradation and learned helplessness. Rather, our job is to participate in a 
conspiracy of hope. It is our job to form a community of hope which surrounds 
people with psychiatric disabilities (Deegan, 1996. p. 11).  
So the process becomes one of questioning the practice as well as the practice 
environment in which the social worker contributes. The discourse of recovery processes 
these questions, continuously reflecting on a more radical definition of hope, a hope that 
is not only lived out but ingrained in the professional who takes up the discourse. 
This undertaking of radicalizing the notion of hope has not emerged without 
criticism. In becoming a discourse, recovery has been challenged at onset. The voice of 
recovery, in defining its mission to speak about recovery has been criticized for the 
operational term, “recovery”. Specifically, the use of the word has been criticized for not 
being evidence-based (Remington & Shammi, 2005), not being operationally defined 
(Liberman & Kopelowicz, 2005), and having unrealistic expectations (Satel, 2006). It 
goes without saying that these criticisms echo the earlier accusations of logical 
positivists’ positions against the field of mental health, as it became its own respected 
entity. Critics state that the term “recovery” has been used so broadly and loosely that it 
is becoming meaningless (Lester & Gask, 2006).   
 “Becoming meaningless” is a useful point to reflect on in this thesis, as 
consciousness of language becomes the distinguishing factor of what is linguistically 
relevant. The question becomes “Becoming meaningless to whom?” Though these 
criticisms may be warranted in some ways, there underlies a defensiveness that keeps one 
from truly engaging with the word “recovery”, for criticism stultify that which has 
emerged and become something more, throughout history, in the person as well as the 
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movement. And criticism of this word “recovery”, scientific or otherwise, has not 
stopped masses of people from speaking out, from working together to be heard and to 
make it known that they are opposed to a dominant discourse that excludes not only 
notions of recovery, but the research that reveals recovery, toward a wish to offer a more 
inclusive discourse that acknowledges these truths. In the recovery discourse, then, there 
will be acknowledgement that positive change has occurred outside the dominant 
discourse as well as outside the mental health system. This creates resistance in a 
dominant discourse, where there is evidence that people with psychiatric struggles are not 
entirely dependent on the mental health field for change, that indeed the change lies 
within them.  
Operationally Defining "Recovery" 
In this way, recovery truly resides in the person, as does the recovery discourse. 
Recovery has been defined in many ways, as Deegan states “the concept of recovery is 
rooted in the simple yet profound realization that people who have been diagnosed with 
mental illness are human beings” (2001, p. 3). As social workers contemplate this 
definition, one may question if this statement is in any way falsified or diminished within 
the mental health practice. Ridgway (1999) suggests that the potential for growth and 
transformation in the labeled individual has been overlooked by the mental health system, 
a system rooted in a deficiency model of knowing and treating, and underscores these 
core values:  
recovery is often described as a process in which an individual confronts 
challenges using a unique combination of strengths, vulnerabilities, and available 
resources. Recovery is often said to be a nonlinear process that involves making 
progress, losing ground, and pressing forward again. (Onken, Craig, Ridgway, 
Ralph & Cook , 2007, p.10):  
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Though the remainder of this thesis is not intended to educate social workers on 
the values and procedures of the recovery discourse, some aspects will be touched on, as 
a final way of closing this discussion on language.  There are many aspects of recovery 
language, one being that of “peer support” as a way of integrating the faces and voices of 
hope into the mental health system, by literally bringing those with labels into the mental 
health setting to work as individuals who are in recovery. These individuals act as peers 
to those who participate in mental health settings. They advocate for the rights and voices 
of those receiving treatment in the system, and they produce a constant reminder of hope 
and of possibility. They represent transformation. Peer support has been recognized as 
one of the fundamental parts of recovery (Samhsa, 2006), as it “challenges the more 
linear, dynamic view that there is a problem to be fixed . . . peer support by definition 
assumes relationship and reciprocity” (Mead and MacNeil, 2008). As one person with a 
label states,  
In order to recover, one needs to find peer support, and in order to do so, one 
needs to have alternative healing techniques, one has to have access to those kinds 
of people and treatments that one can control oneself, and not perpetually have to 
be dependent on medication and doctors, and a psychiatric system that does not 
necessarily have our best interests at heart. (NCD, 2000) 
Following this intent, a recovery discourse talks about having a mutual 
relationship. Surrey (1987) encourages empowerment between client and clinician, and 
that clinicians need to learn how to have “power-with” and not “power-over” those 
seeking services. As one person with a label explains, “We believe that healing and 
recovery are possible only in an atmosphere in which we control our own lives and make 
free informed decisions about treatment” (NCD, 2000). 
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Mutual relationships include awareness of power (Onken et al., 2007) and an 
emphasis on an individual’s own self-determination, a concept rooted in the sense 
of agency, or self-agency. It carries the belief that individuals have the 
competency to, as quoted in Onken et al. (2007), “surmount the challenges posed 
by a psychiatric disability.” Recovery is about finding meaning and purpose, and 
finding new ways of coping that are not based on an illness model, embracing 
wellness, thriving toward something better, and realizing the existence of 
recovery (Onken et al., 2007). 
  Ridgway (2004) suggests that recovery and resiliency are interrelated. Resiliency, 
though left up to the person to define, can mean any of the ways that a person copes with 
adversity and incorporates a new sense of self. Resiliency can include self-initiated 
therapeutic techniques that affirm this process. In a qualitative study, Deegan interviewed 
29 people with psychiatric diagnoses to understand their capacity for resilience. She 
found one common theme to be "personal medicine", which includes self-initiated 
activities that contribute to self care. This may be linked to findings discussed in Chapter 
five on the benefits of focusing the mind and shifting one's attention. Interestingly, 
Deegan found that this technique, valued by the interviewees as one of the main 
components of their recovery process, was not generally disclosed to mental health 
clinicians. Further, clinicians rarely asked about these self-help processes. In another 
article, Deegan illustrates this experience of not having her own self-help processes 
included in the mental health setting: 
The fact that I was a good athlete, that I enjoyed being in nature, that I was the 
oldest child from a large working class family was of little interest to the 
professionals around me. What mattered most in their eyes was that I was a 
schizophrenic. . . everything I did was interpreted as part of my psychiatric 
disability (2004, p.2). 
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The study also offered some alternative understandings to medication non-
adherence, as Deegan found that non-adherence was often a result of psychiatric 
medications interfering with one's ability to continue personal medicine.  
Holding a curiosity to this contemplation of recovery discourse, does the social 
worker value this unique combination? Does the field of social work, or the field of 
mental health, operate on an understanding that progress in the individual is a nonlinear 
process? As one engages the discourse, one will find resourceful ways to begin 
understanding and grasping the complexity of these simple questions. One way of 
beginning this process is by first by recognizing that the recovery discourse is not born in 
the mental health system, but resides in it. Listening and hearing a Recovery discourse is 
not about adopting a language or transplanting a fast-paced anti-stigma program; rather it 
is about understanding a language, taking it in deeply, contemplating the words and 
thoughts that have been chosen, questioning where the words are in relation to this 
fundamental change, considering words that create distance or nearness, holding a 
curiosity for why this language has been kept out of the dominant mental health 
discourse, locating the discontinuity, and finally questioning where or how it can be let 
in. And then, as the social worker contemplates this other discourse, one may witness a 
shift in the language, a shift that is deeply intentional and anything but mechanical. 
Making this shift becomes an act of inclusion for the social worker who wishes to 
integrate a recovery discourse, as Deegan states: 
My real hope for re-humanizing the human services rests with people with 
disabilities as we begin learning that we can organize, that we have power in our 
numbers, and that we can overcome oppression through expression. The days of 
silence are over. As professionals and as fellow human beings, we have a great 
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deal to learn from the people we seek to serve. It is important to listen to people 
with disabilities (1990, p. 310).  
So, the question becomes one of asking how social workers can integrate this voice on an 
agency and policy level. Perhaps by questioning first the values and integrity of social 
work, one can see the parallel to the recovery discourse. The preamble to NASW’s Code 
of Ethics states: 
Social workers promote social justice and social change with and on behalf of 
clients. . . and strive to end discrimination, oppression, poverty, and other forms 
of social injustice. Social workers seek to enhance the capacity of people to 
address their own needs. Social workers also seek to promote the responsiveness 
of organizations, communities, and other social institutions to individuals’ needs 
and social problems (NASW,1996). 
To “enhance the capacity of people to address their own needs” is indeed one of the 
underlying fundamental aspects of the recovery discourse, as well as a striving to end 
various forms of oppression.  In this reflection, what is revealed is the proclivity of the 
social worker to naturally engage with and incorporate a recovery discourse. Indeed, 
many social workers are. To take this further, the NASW states in section 1.12: “Social 
workers should not use derogatory language in their written or verbal communications to 
or about clients. Social workers should use accurate and respectful language in all 
communications to and about clients” (NASW, 1996).  
Perhaps this gets at the crux of discourse and of the social work field’s stated 
position on harmful language. For it is written clearly that harmful language must be 
taken seriously. In contemplating a space for the recovery discourse, the question 
becomes: Accurate and respectful language according to whom? Should social workers 
be listening to those who are stating that the language used is inaccurate as well as 
disrespectful? While questioning the hollow space of idealized words may be 
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contentious, the contradictions within the social work profession are brought to light.  
While sitting with resistance, there exists an opportunity to recognize the hardened heart 
that exists in the social worker, as well as the client. The space to be filled, perhaps 
measured by language, is the opened-up place where seeking social justice and equality 
in the mental health field begins to grow, take form, become something more than the 
words themselves.    
But those maintaining and creating a recovery discourse also contemplate: “Do 
we change the personal narrative or change the dominant discourse? To a certain extent 
we are more comfortable in the prolonged processing of these questions” (Onken et al., 
2007). An interesting point to end on, this space that those creating a recovery discourse 
take to nurture the relevance of change from within before challenging the dominant 
discourse is worth noting. In closing this thesis, questions remain about this change of the 
dominant discourse, and about the place of social work regarding this change.   
Though the field of social work has not embraced efforts toward a consciousness 
of language, nor much regard for this contemplation of a recovery discourse, some bodies 
of knowledge within the mental health field have looked toward creating a shift that is 
more conscious and more inclusive of those with disabilities. In 1992, the APA produced 
guidelines for publication that reflected values held within the recovery discourse. These 
values include using person-first language (not calling someone by their disability, and 
not considering a person’s disability before the person), avoiding the labeling of 
individuals outside of diagnostic procedures, avoiding calling individuals “patients” or 
“invalids”, avoiding overextending the severity of a disability by using terms like 
“chronic mental illness”, focusing on emotionally neutral expressions, emphasizing 
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abilities instead of limitations, avoiding offensive expressions such as “crazy” or 
“paranoid” which can be replaced by “symptoms of”, and focus on the right and capacity 
of individuals to express their own goals and preferences (APA, 1992).  
In light of these efforts, the questions seemingly become clear. In looking over 
these past few years of my social work education, questions arise about the field of social 
work, the social work identity, and its place in recognizing and responding to oppression 
in the mental health field.  Social workers, at large, still use most of the descriptors the 
APA cautions against in their suggestions for non-biased language, as does the mental 
health field at large. Social workers may provide many reactions for why the use of 
harmful language is necessary. Resistance aside, this thesis poses questions about the 
place of social work in the mental health field, and how it differentiates itself as a field of 
taking the environment and not just the individual into account. Where power lies, 
paradoxical intentions collide, and from a recovery discourse perspective, these requests 
of using respectful language are merely small steps toward encompassing a greater, more 
conscious inclusion of the individual. Recovery discourse is starting from the inside first, 
and this healing process of great value, seems to be worth the inquiry of the social 
worker. Yet, the silence of social work as a field on this matter remains a mystery to 
which the social worker is left to contemplate.  
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